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The essential facilities doctrine may be seen as the ‘extra weight’ which is put onto the 
balance, in order to give precedence to the maintenance of competition over the complete 
contractual freedom of undertakings controlling an important and unique facility. The main 
purpose of the doctrine is to impose upon such ‘dominant’ undertakings the duty to negotiate 
and/or give access to the facility, against a reasonable fee, to other undertakings, which 
cannot pursue their own activity (and therefore will perish) without access to such a facility.  
This very simple description of the content of the doctrine underlines its limitations: through 
the imposition of a duty to negotiate or contractual obligations, the rule tends to compensate 
for the weaknesses of the competitive structure of a market, which are due to the existence of 
some essential facility. In other words, the doctrine does not by itself provide a definitive 
solution to the lack of competition, but tends to contractually maintain or even create some 
competition.1  
The doctrine of essential facilities originates in the US antitrust case law of the Circuit and 
District Courts, but has never been officially acknowledged by the Supreme Court. It has been 
further developed and hotly debated by scholars in the US, both from a legal and from an 
economic viewpoint. In the EU, the essential facilities doctrine was openly introduced by the 
Commission during the early 1990s, but has received only limited and indirect support by the 
Court of First Instance (the CFI) and the European Court of Justice (the ECJ). It also indirectly 
inspired the legislation concerning the deregulation of traditional ‘natural’ monopolies.  
The judicial origin of the doctrine, combined with the hesitant application by the appeal courts, 
both in the US and the EU, cast uncertainty not only on the precise scope of the doctrine, but 
also on the issue of its very existence. These questions receive a particular light within the EU 
context, where the doctrine is called upon to play a different role from its US counterpart. In 
order to address the above issues, we will first pretend that an EU essential facility doctrine 
does indeed exist and we shall try to identify the scope and content thereof, through its main 
                                                          
* I am grateful to David Howarth for extremely useful comments on a previous draft of the present chapter – the usual 
disclaimer applies. I also want to acknowledge funding from the Milton and Miriam Handler Foundation during my 
term at the University of Michigan, when the present chapter was completed. 
 
1 This was recognized by the Court of First Instance (the CFI) in its judgment in Case T-102/96 Gencor v. 
Commission [1999] ECR II-753, where, in annulment proceedings against a Commission decision under Reg. 
4064/89 which imposed access rights to third parties, the CFI held, in para 319, that ‘it is true that commitments 
which are structural in nature … are, as a rule, preferable from the point of view of the Regulation's objective, 
inasmuch as they prevent once and for all, or at least for some time, the emergence or strengthening of the dominant 
position … Nevertheless, the possibility cannot automatically be ruled out that commitments which prima facie are 
behavioural, for instance not to use a trademark for a certain period, or to make part of the production capacity of the 
entity arising from the concentration available to third-party competitors, or, more generally, to grant access to 
essential facilities on non-discriminatory terms, may themselves also be capable of preventing the emergence or 
strengthening of a dominant position.’ 
 3
applications (Section 1). Subsequently, we will try to answer the question whether such a 
doctrine should exist at all in the EU (Section 2). 
 
1. If there were an EU doctrine …  
The origin of the essential facilities doctrine is to be found in the case law of the US courts. 
The foundations of the doctrine are generally regarded as having been laid down by the 
Supreme Court itself. There are two pairs of milestone cases. The first pair concerns common 
action (= joint venture or concerted practice) by several undertakings, while the second pair 
refers to unilateral action.  
The starting point of the doctrine is to be found in the judgment of the Supreme Court in 
United States v. Terminal Railroad Association.2 This case concerned the association set up 
by fourteen out of the twenty-four rail companies which serviced, at the time, the St. Louis 
Railway Station. This joint venture would manage the infrastructure necessary for getting 
access to the said railway station, which included a bridge that was technically impossible to 
duplicate. Therefore, the joint venture could completely exclude the remaining ten companies 
from the said piece of infrastructure and drive them out of the relevant market. The Supreme 
Court, however, recognized that the projected joint venture could lead to rationalization and to 
economies of scale and did not order its divestiture. Instead, the Court imposed the condition 
that the joint venture should allow the non-participating undertakings access to the jointly 
controlled (essential) facility. The later Associated Press case3 concerned the prohibition 
imposed by the news agency on its members not to sell or otherwise transmit to non-
members some categories of news. The Supreme Court considered that this very significant 
network of no less than 1.200 members involved in collecting, processing and distributing 
news was of crucial importance in the relevant market. Therefore, competitors could not 
reasonably operate without having access to it.  
Unilateral action by a dominant undertaking was at issue in Otter Tail Power Co. v. United 
States.4 The appellant was a highly integrated company which produced, transmitted and 
distributed electric power and which refused to a) sell energy in bulk to its competitors, b) 
offer them capacity in its transmission grid or c) give them access to its local distribution 
network. The Supreme Court held that in some markets, such as the energy market, access 
to the grid is the only means by which competition can develop. Therefore, it imposed the 
relevant obligation on the electricity company, in order to stimulate competition. In Aspen 
Skiing5 the objective was not the creation of new, but the maintenance of existing 
competition. This case concerned the decision by a dominant undertaking, which managed 
three ski resorts, to interrupt its previous dealings with the owner of a fourth, smaller resort 
                                                          
2 United States v. Terminal Railroad Association, 224 U.S. 383 (1912). 
3 Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945). 
4 Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973). 
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and to stop issuing common ski passes for all four. This would commercially isolate the 
smaller resort and weaken its position in the relevant market, in which the other undertaking 
was already dominant. The Supreme Court found that such a refusal was not commercially 
justifiable and imposed the relevant obligation. Subsequent to these “foundation” cases the 
Supreme Court has occasionally applied the essential facilities doctrine, without ever explicitly 
acknowledging it. It is worth noting that the first time the term was ever used by the Supreme 
Court was as late as 1999, in an obiter dictum.6 However, in its most recent case law the 
Supreme Court has cast shadows on the very existence of a US ‘essential facilities’ doctrine. 
In Trinko7 the issue at stake was the extent to which the incumbent monopolist in the 
telecommunications market in New York, Verizon, was under an obligation to provide access 
to its local networks to new entrants. The Supreme Court avoided taking a position on 
whether the doctrine should be considered as ‘established law’, since it considered it to be 
inapplicable on the facts of the case, where a legislative act already provided for mandatory 
access to Verizon’s facilities. It did note, however, a) that the doctrine had been crafted only 
by lower courts, b) that mandatory access could reduce incentives to invest and that c) in 
trying to establish a right price for access, antitrust courts would act as ‘central planners’, a 
role for which they are ill-suited.8
Trinko apart, the above cases may be seen as setting a limit on the freedom to deal, as 
expressed by the Supreme Court itself in its famous ‘Colgate doctrine’.9 A series of Circuit 
and District Court judgments have further explained the rationale, defined the scope and 
identified the conditions for the application of the above Supreme Court decisions, thereby 
giving rise to a ‘doctrine’10. This doctrine has inspired the EU Commission and has also led 
the CFI and ECJ to become involved with the circumstances of its application.11
                                                                                                                                                                      
5 Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985). 
6 AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366 (1999). 
7 Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis v. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398 (2004). For an interesting comment of 
this case and its relevance for EU law see D Geradin, ‘ Limiting the Scope of Article 82 EC: What Can the EU Learn 
from the US Supreme Court’s Judgment in Trinko in the Wake of Microsoft, IMS and Deutsche Telekom?’ (2004) 
CML Rev 1519-1553. 
8 The exact weight which should be given to this judgment is subject to debate, since some authors view it as ‘an 
ideological judgment written by the Court’s most conservative judge (Justice Scalia) whose primary objective was to 
impose a minimalistic vision of antitrust law (see Geradin in the previous note, who presents the view put forward by 
Fox in the 2004 spring meeting of the Antitrust Section of the American Bar Association), while others talk of a more 
liberal (as opposed to a more interventionist) approach ‘celebrated’ by the Supreme Court in Trinko, see I. Forrester, 
‘The Interaction Between Competition Law and Intellectual Property Law’ RSCAS/EUI June 2005, at 
http://www.iue.it/RSCAS/Research/Competition/2005/200510-CompForrester.pdf , at p. 14.  
9 United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919). 
10 See, i.a. Hecht v. Pro-Football Inc., 570 F.2d 982 (D.C. Cir. 1977); United States v. AT&T, 524 F.Supp. 1336 (D.C. 
Cir. 1981); MCI Communications v. AT&T, 708 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1983); Mid-South Grizzlies v. National Football 
League, 720 F.2d 772 (3d Cir. 1983); Fishman v. Estate of Wirtz, 807 F.2d 520 (7th Cir. 1986); Image Technical 
Services v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195 (9th Cir. 1997); Intergraph Corp v. Intel Corp, 3 F. Supp. 2d 1255 
(N.D. Ala. 1998); United States v. Microsoft Corp., Civ. Action no 98-1232 (D.D.C. filed May 18, 1998); AT&T Corp. v. 
Iowa Utils. Bd. above n 6. 
11 For a general overview of the relevant case law see, in addition to the numerous articles quoted below, in relation 
to specific issues, the more general contributions by D Glasl, ‘Essential Facilities Doctrine in EC antitrust Law; a 
contribution to the current debate’ (1994) ECLR 306; M Furse, ‘The essential Facilities Doctrine in Community Law’ 
(1995) ECLR 469; and more recently L Flynn, ‘The Essential Facilities Doctrine in the Community Courts’ (1999) 
Commercial Law Practitioner 245. 
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1.1. Case law pointing to the existence of a doctrine 
1.1.1. At the EU level 
1.1.1.1 Commission practice 
The Commission has developed an extensive case law where recourse is made to the 
doctrine of essential facilities. In many of its decisions the Commission expressly refers to the 
doctrine, while in others – especially in the most recent ones – it follows the doctrine without 
naming it. The relevant Commission decisions, depending on their subject matter, may be 
classified into four main categories.  
a) Ports 
The very first case in which the Commission expressly applied the essential facilities doctrine 
was in Β&Ι/Sealink,12 concerning the use of the port of Holyhead. Sealink owned the port and 
was at the same time using it in order to offer transport services. It decided to change its own 
timetables, so that its vessels obstructed B&I’s loading procedure, thus rendering it more time 
consuming. In the second case concerning the same port, Sea Containers/Stena Sealink,13 
the complainant had no presence whatsoever in the port, but required access, in order to 
penetrate the relevant market. In both cases the Commission decided in favour of the 
complainants and  awarded interim measures. In the former case, the Commission held that 
the owner of the essential facility was subject to a special duty of non-discrimination: he could 
not reserve to his competitors less favourable treatment from the one reserved to his own 
activities, based on the essential facility.14 In the latter case, the Commission made it plain 
that the doctrine would not be restricted to ensuring fair treatment of existing competitors, but 
would also apply for allowing new entrants into the market.  
The two further Commission decisions on ports have the particularity of concerning, at least 
formally, measures by public authorities, not private undertakings.15 In Port of Rødby,16 the 
Commission found that Article 82 EC together with Article 86 EC were being violated by the 
Danish government which refused the competitor of the state-owned ferry company a) 
authorization for the construction of a new facility close the existing one and b) access rights 
                                                          
12 Β&Ι/Sealink, Decision (interim measures) of 11 June 1992, EC Bull. 6-1992, at 1.3.30. On this decision see N 
Maltby, ‘Restrictions on Port Operators: Sealink/B&I Holyhead’ (1993) ECLR 223. 
13 Sea Containers/Stena Sealink, Decision (interim measures) of 21 December 1993, 94/19/EC, ΕΕ L 15, 18-1-94, 8. 
14 The ‘special’ character of the duty of non-discrimination lies precisely on the fact that the comparison is not held 
between the various competitors which seek access to the facility, but as between the holder of the facility himself, 
and any of his competitors in a downstream market. 
15 On the issue of the application of competition rules to public measures and internal market rules to private ones, 
see J Baquero Cruz, Between Competition and Free Movement (Oxford/Portland, Hart Publishing, 2002), where the 
reader is to find extensive references to further bibliography. 
16 Port of Rødby, Decision of 21 December 1993, 90/119/ΕC, ΕΕ L 55, 26-2-94, 52. 
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to the existing facility. The same logic prevailed in ICG/CCI Morlaix (Port of Roscoff),17 where 
the Commission ordered the Chambers of Commerce of Morlaix, in Brittany, to give access to 
the port of Roscoff to an Irish company who wanted to set up a new route, in which no 
undertaking was present. 
b) Airports  
In London European/Sabena,18 the Commission ordered the Belgian company to allow the 
British firm access to its computerized reservation system (CRS), for the Brussels-London 
route.19 In British Midland/Aer Lingus,20the Irish company was compelled to continue its 
interlining agreement21 with the complainant company, for at least two years. In FAG-
Flughafen Frankfurt/Main AG22, the company operating the airport was ordered to allow other 
undertakings to offer groundhandling services, in competition to its own services. Similarly, in 
Alpha Flight Services/Aéroports de Paris,23 the airport operating company was obliged to 
charge non-discriminatory fees to all the undertakings offering catering services within the 
airport, even though it did not, itself, have any presence in this secondary market. 
c) Rail infrastructure 
The Channel Tunnel has given rise to two important Commission decisions. In Night 
Services,24 the Commission cleared the creation of a joint venture for the provision of night 
services through the Tunnel, subject to the condition that, after a grace period of eight years, 
the infrastructure should be accessible to any competitor.25 Similarly, in Eurotunnel26 the 
Commission intervened, requiring the owner of the Channel tunnel, while it committed 
capacity to the French and British rail companies, to make sure that some capacity would be 
set aside for potential new entrants. Both these Decisions were set aside by the CFI, but for 
reasons which do not negate the application of the essential facilities doctrine.27
d) Intellectual property  
                                                          
17 ICG/CCI Morlaix (Port of Roscoff), Decision (interim measures) of 16 May 1995 (IV/35.388) 5 CMLR (1995), 177. 
18 London European/Sabena, Decision 88/589/EEC, ΕΕ L 317, 24-11-88, 47. 
19 It is doubtful, however, whether it is justified to present this case as an application of the essential facilities doctrine 
since a) there was already competition along the route in question and b) the CRS in question was not the only one 
existing in the market, since other companies already operated alternative CRS. 
20 British Midland/Aer Lingus, Decision 92/213/ΕEC, ΕΕ L 96/34 (1992). 
21 Interlining agreements are concluded between air companies, in order to allow passengers to use a single ticket for 
flights with all the participating air companies, change flights between the various companies, offer common 
groundhandling services etc. Interlining produces ‘network externalities’ and makes air companies with such 
agreements more attractive to passengers than small ‘isolated’ companies. 
22 FAG-Flughafen Frankfurt/Main AG, Decision of 14 January 1998, 98/190/ΕC, ΕΕ L 72, 11-3-98, 30. 
23 Alpha Flight Services/Aéroports de Paris, Decision of 11 June 1998, ΙV.35.613, ΕΕ L 230, 210. This Commission 
decision has been upheld on appeal, by the CFI, see Case T-128/98 Aéroports de Paris v. Commission [2000] ECR 
II-3929 and further by the ECJ, see Case C-82/01 P Aéroports de Paris v. Commission [2002] ECR I-9297. 
24 Night Services, Decision of the 21September 1994, 94/663/ΕC, (IV/34.600) OJ L 259/20. 
25 It is worth noting that this case presents considerable similarities with the US Terminal Railroad Association case 
above n 2. 
26 Eurotunnel, Decision of the 13 December 1994, 94/894/EC, IV/32.490, OJ 1994 L 354 31-12-94, 66. 
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The Commission applied the essential facilities doctrine in respect of intellectual property 
rights (IPRs) for the first time in the famous Magill decision.28 The fact that the Commission 
decision has been upheld both by the CFI and the ECJ and the grounds for doing so, have 
been extensively commented upon.29 In the Tiercé Ladbroke decision the Commission,30 in a 
decision later upheld by the CFI,31 showed itself respectful of the IPRs covering horse race 
images and refused to order their holder to assign them to the bookmakers taking bets on 
these same races. In NDC Health/IMS Health,32 the Commission ordered the holder of a 
patent for a database to allow its competitors to use the database’s information structure 
(based on a mapping of the German territory in 1860 or 2847 bricks: “the brick structure”), in 
order to offer a competitive database. This interim decision was quashed by an Order of the 
President of the CFI,33 subsequently confirmed by an Order of the President of the ECJ.34 
The Commission later withdrew its decision, since a judgment by the Frankfurt Higher 
Regional Court allowed third parties to develop a brick structure very similar to the one 
patented by IMS.35 At the same time, the Frankfurt District Court, from which IMS had asked 
for protection of its patent rights, submitted three preliminary questions to the ECJ, on the 
same issues discussed in the annulment proceedings. The Court’s judgment, strongly 
debated already before being delivered 36 recognized that IMS could be ordered to give a 
compulsory license on its patented structure.37 The material conditions for this to happen, 
restrictively defined by the ECJ, had to be ascertained by the referring court.  
The recent Microsoft decision is highly relevant in this respect.38 In an investigation, which 
was initiated as early as August 2000, the Commission has identified two abuses by the 
world’s leading software company. (i) In the field of interoperability, Windows (a PC operating 
system) is designed to work better with Microsoft’s own low-end network software (used for 
work group servers), while rivals are being refused access to essential code and interface 
information. The remedy adopted by the Commission in its decision is the imposition of core 
                                                                                                                                                                      
27 See joined Cases T-374/94, T-375/94, T-384/94 and T-388/94 European Night Services  [1998] ECR II-3141 and 
Case T-79 & 80/95 SNCF & BRB v. Commission [1996] ECR II-1491. 
28 Magill TV Guide/ITP, BBC & RTE, Decision of 21 December 1989, OJ L 78, 43. 
29 See R Whish, Competition Law, 5th ed (United Kingdom, Butterworth & Co Publishers, 2003), 665 et seq., and the 
bibliography quoted there. 
30 Commission Decision of 24 June 1993 (IV/33.699). 
31 Case T-504/93 Tiercé Ladbroke v. Commission [1997] ECR ΙΙ-923. 
32 NDC Health/IMS Health, Decision (interim measures) of 3 July 2001, OJ 2002 L 59, 18. 
33 Orders of the 26th of October 2001.  
34 Case C-481/01 P(R) [2002] ECR I-3401. 
35 See Press Release n. IP/03/1159 of 13-8-2003 available at the Rapid database, http://europa.eu.int/rapid/. 
36 This is why reference to the relevant doctrine is deemed important. See i.a. G Zebedee & C Dussart-Lefret, 
‘Commission exceptionally orders the licensing of a copyright to safeguard competition in the German 
pharmaceutical sales reports market’ (1/2002) Competition Policy Newsletter, 61; M M M Griffiths, ‘Court’s 
Intervention Intensifies Debate About Commission’s Imposition of Interim Measures on IMS Health’ EuroWatch, 15-9-
2001, 3; L Idot Europe 11/2001, comm. 331; more recently C Stothers, ‘The end of exclusivity?: Abuse of Intellectual 
Property Rights in the EU’ ,(2002) European Intellectual Property Review,86; F Fine, ‘NDC/IMS: A Logical Application 
of Essential Facilities Doctrine’, available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/intelpropertycomments/finefrank.pdf; 
also the extremely interesting article by counsel in Magill and IMS, I Forrester, ‘Compulsory Licensing in Europe: a 
Rare Cure to Aberrant National Intellectual Property Rights’, available at 
http://www.whitecase.com/article_competition_ip_law_forrester.html. 
37 Case C-418/01 IMS Health v NDC Health [2004] nyr. For a fuller account of this judgment see below at 1.1.1.2. 
38 Commission Decision of 24 March 2004, COMP/C-3.37.792, C(2004) 900 final.  
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disclosure obligations that would be indispensable for Microsoft’s competitors to achieve full 
interoperability with Windows. Importantly enough, disclosure does not extend to the source 
code, let alone the software itself, but is restricted to interface information.39 This may in fact 
mean that Microsoft, in order to comply with the decision, has to put up extra work and 
produce a comprehensive set of interface information (which is of use only to the 
competitors), but it also means that the “essential” software itself continues to be protected. In 
other words, the measure ordered by the Commission is only apt to secure “vertical” 
interoperability (between the basic or “essential” software and applications which are based 
on this basic software), but not horizontal (between software programs which have the same 
basic functions).40 To the extent that any of this interface information might be protected by 
intellectual property in the European Economic Area, Microsoft would be entitled to 
reasonable remuneration.41 (ii) The second abuse identified by the Commission is a tying 
practice, whereby Microsoft is offering its Media Player as an integrated part of the operating 
system, thereby excluding all competition on the merits. The remedy adopted by the 
Commission in this respect is that Microsoft be obliged to offer a version of Windows without 
the Media Player included (typical untying obligation).42 The more drastic remedy of a ‘must 
carry’ obligation, whereby Microsoft would be obliged to offer competing media players with 
Windows, was dropped by the Commission at the last minute. Such a remedy would rest on 
the idea that the operating system is an essential facility, to which competitors need access in 
order to compete in downstream markets, such as the one for media players.43 However, the 
fact that such a remedy has not been adopted makes the second violation identified by the 
Commission less interesting for the application of the essential facilities doctrine.  
1.1.1.2. The CFI/ECJ 
The EC Courts have been far more reserved in the application of the essential facilities 
doctrine, despite the fact that several Advocates General have openly discussed, in their 
opinions, the conditions and effects thereof.  
                                                          
39 i.e. the ‘hooks’ on which the competitors may connect their own operation systems which would ‘talk’ to Windows. 
40 For the distinction between ‘vertical’ and ‘horizontal’ interoperability, and for other extremely interesting 
developments concerning the need not to confer absolute legal protection to software programs, see the excellent 
article by B Rotenberg, ‘The Legal Regulation of Software Interoperability in the EU: Confronting Microsoft with 
Appleby and Chassangou’ Jean Monnet Working Paper 7/05, at 13. 
41 Under the surveillance of a Monitoring Trustee, named by the Commission decision. 
42 Although this obligation has been criticized because a) it allows the regulator to intervene in the very design of the 
products, b) it forces the dominant firm to put into the market an inferior quality product, c) while it does not make any 
provision for such a product to be sold at an inferior price; see Heinemann, ‘Compulsory Licences and Product 
Integration in European Competition Law – Assesment of the European Commission’s Microsoft Decision’ (2005) 
International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law – ICC, 63-82, at 79 et seq. 
43 It is worth noting that a series of actions against Microsoft have been brought by the US Federal Trade Committee 
and the Department of Justice, for which see http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/ms_index.htm. At this occasion also, the 
application of the essential facilities doctrine has been adequately discussed; see M Harz, ‘Dominance and Duty in 
the EU : A Look Through Microsoft Windows at the Essential Facilities Doctrine’, available at 
http://www.law.emory.edu/EILR/volumes/spg97/HARZ.html and J Lopatka & W Page, ‘Microsoft, Monopolization and 
Network Externalities: Some Uses and Abuses of Economic Theory in Antitrust Decision Making’ (1995) Antitrust 
Bulletin, 317. See also on the similar Intel case ‘Intel and the Essential Facilities Doctrine’ available at 
http://www.cptech.org. Unsurprisingly, the EC Commission’s decision is more restrictive for Microsoft than the US 
equivalent. 
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1.1.1.2.1. The ECJ 
The Magill judgment44 is seen as the ‘unconfessed’ adoption by the ECJ of the doctrine of 
essential facilities. In this case, without expressly referring to the doctrine, the Court found 
that in ‘exceptional circumstances’ third parties should be granted access to goods/services 
(such as TV listings), despite the fact that they were protected by IPRs. This would occur 
where three conditions, detrimental to competition, were met: that by refusing to licence, the 
holder of the right a) reserved for himself a secondary market (that of TV guides), thus 
excluding all possible competition and b) rendered impossible the emergence of a new 
product (comprehensive TV guides), for which demand existed in the market. Further, c) any 
objective justification should be absent. This judgment clearly restricted the freedom to refuse 
supply, which the ECJ had bestowed upon holders of IPRs some years earlier, in the Maxicar 
v. Renault45 and Volvo v. Veng46 cases. Moreover, it raised a wave of criticism and 
uncertainty as to the precise value of IPRs.47
The second occasion on which the Court was faced with the application of the essential 
facilities doctrine, was in the Oscar Bronner case.48 In his opinion, Advocate General Jacobs 
offered a quite extensive and knowledgeable discussion of the doctrine. The Court 
substantially followed the Advocate General and held that access to a facility (a nationwide 
system of home delivery for newspapers) could only be granted if, on top of Magill’s 
‘exceptional circumstances’, two cumulative conditions were satisfied: a) that the refusal to 
deal was likely to eliminate all competition from the relevant market, on the part of the person 
requesting access and b) that the facility ‘in itself be indispensable to carrying on that 
person's business, inasmuch as there is no actual or potential substitute in existence’.49 This 
last condition, which is the main contribution of this judgment in the application of the 
essential facilities doctrine,50 would only be fulfilled if i) there are no plausible alternatives to 
the facility, even of an inferior quality (such as selling through the post, kiosks, shops etc)51 
                                                          
44 Case C-241 & 242/91 P Radio Telefis Eireann v. Commission [1995] ECR I-743, thereby upholding previous 
judgments by the CFI, see Cases T-69/89 & T-76/89 RTE & ITP v. Commission [1991] ECR II-485 & 575, 
respectively.  
45 Case 53/87 Maxicar v. Renault [1988] ECR 6039. 
46 Case 238/87 Volvo v. Veng [1988] ECR 6211. 
47 See among others I Govaere The Use and Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights in EC Law (London, Sweet & 
Maxwell, 1996), esp. Chapter 5 ‘Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights under the Competition Rules’; V Korah, ‘The 
interface between intellectual property and antitrust: the European experience’ (2001) Antitrust L.J. 801 and ‘The 
Ladbroke Saga’ (1998) ECLR, 169; A Overd & B Bishop, ‘Essential facilities : The rising Tide’ (1998) ECLR 183; R 
Subioto, ‘The Right to Deal with Whom One Pleases Under EEC Competition Law: A Small Contribution to a 
Necessary Debate’ (1992) ECLR 234. 
48 Case C-7/97, Oscar Bronner GmbH & Co. KG v. Mediaprint Zeinungs-und Zeitschriftenverlag Gmbh & Co. KG 
[1998] ECR I-779. For this case see i.a. E Gippini- Fournier, ‘“Essential facilities” y applicacion del articulo 82 CE a la 
negativa unilateral a contratar. Algunas consideraciones tras la sentencia Bronner’ (2000) Gaz.Jur.U.E.Comp 77 ; L 
Hancher, ‘Caselaw: Court of Justice (Oscar Bronner v. Mediaprint)’ (1999) CML Rev 1289 ; and R Pillitteri, ‘La Corte 
di Giustizia circonscrive rigorosamente I confini di applicazione della c.d. « essential facilities doctrine » nella 
repression dell’ abuso di posizione dominante’ (1999) Diritto del Commercio Internazionale 1024. 
49 See Oscar Bronner above n 48, para 41. 
50 See in this respect D Neven & P Mavroidis, ‘The Interface Between Competition and Contract Law. The Case of 
Essential Facilities’ EUI 2003 EU Competition Law and Policy Workshop/Proceedings, available at 
http://www.iue.it/RSCAS/Research/Competition/2003/200306COMP-Neven-Mavroidis-sII.pdf
51 Oscar Bronner above n 48, para 43. 
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and ii) the impossibility of duplicating the facility is objective, due to ‘technical, legal or 
economic obstacles’ and not to the limited capacities (e.g. inadequate output) of the specific 
competitor requiring access.52 This case is clearly more restrictive and less far-reaching than 
the judgment in Magill. It seems, however, to stand for the acceptance/confirmation, albeit in 
a restricted form, of the essential facilities doctrine.  
The view that an essential facilities doctrine does exist in EU law cannot be seriously disputed 
after the judgment of the Court in the IMS v. NDC case.53 First, the Court started its reply, and 
indeed based the entire judgment ‘on the premise … that the use of the 1860 brick structure 
is indispensable to allow a potential competitor to have access to the market’.54 Second, the 
Court, following on this point Advocate General Tizzano’s opinion, rephrased the second and 
third questions of the referring court: while the questions had as their object to determine 
whether the participation of pharmaceutical companies in the definition of the protected 
structure and their eventual efforts to adapt to any alternative structure, made IMS’s refusal 
abusive, the Court gave judgment on whether these elements rendered the protected 
structure essential. Only because these were found to be ‘indispensable’ for competitors, 
IMS’s refusal could qualify as abusive. Third, the Court did indeed find that, when ‘exceptional 
conditions’ are met, the refusal to licence would be abusive. Therefore, from a formal point of 
view all the elements of an essential facilities doctrine, though not the name, have been 
acknowledged by the ECJ in its judgment in IMS Health.55
 From a substantive point of view the Court’s judgment in IMS Health is important in two 
ways. First, it further explains some of the ‘exceptional’ Magill conditions and especially, the 
requirement that the refusal to licence competitors is only abusive when such competitors 
wish to put into the market ‘new products or services not offered by the copyright owner and 
for which there is a potential consumer demand’56. Second, it gives an (imperfect) answer to 
one of the main theoretical queries linked with the scope of the essential facilities doctrine: 
should there be a clear distinction between the market of the facility, in which its owner is 
dominant, on the one hand and the ancillary market (upstream or downstream) in which the 
competitor will compete using the facility, on the other?57  
1.1.1.2.2. The CFI 
                                                          
52 Oscar Bronner above n 48, para 44. 
53 Above, n 37. and for an extensive explanation as to why this case may be seen as the consecration by the ECJ of 
the essential facilities doctrine, see our comments in CML Rev (2004) 1613-1638. Contra, see D Geradin, above n 7 
at 1539 who states that ‘[i]n sum, as in US antitrust law, there does not seem to be an “essential facilities” doctrine 
formally recognized by the ECJ’. 
54 IMS Health, above n 37, para 22, emphasis added. 
55 The doctrine of essential facilities has been argued by the parties and discussed by the Court in another couple of 
cases, in which, however, the Court did not make reference to the doctrine: Case C-363/01 Flughafen Hannover-
Langenhagen [2003] nyr, and Case C-109/03 KPN Telekom v OPTA [2004] nyr; for both these cases see below 
1.1.2. At the member States level. 
56 IMS Health v. NDC Health, para 52 and operative part. Further for this requirement see below 1.2.1.5. 
57 For the answer to this question see below 1.2.1.3. Elimination of competition. 
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The CFI in  the Tiercé Ladbroke case,58 upheld the Commission’s decision, in holding that 
horse race images are not necessary for the taking of bets on races and therefore, do not 
qualify as an essential facility.  Moreover, the CFI made it plain that the doctrine could not be 
invoked by an undertaking which already has a strong presence in the relevant market and 
which only wishes to strengthen its position. In European Night Services59 the CFI annulled 
the restrictions imposed by the Commission on the members of the joint venture.60 Three 
points of this judgment merit attention. First, that the doctrine may not apply to an undertaking 
which does not occupy a dominant position in the relevant market (in the market of rail, road, 
air and intermodal transport, the joint venture only held 7%).61 Second, the CFI was stricter 
than the Commission on the conditions that render a facility ‘essential’. Therefore, contrary to 
the Commission, the CFI found that neither the locomotives, nor the specialized personnel, 
were part of the facility to which access could be claimed. Third, the CFI, taking into account 
the importance of the investments required for the setting up and running of the joint venture, 
annulled the Commission’s decision, to the extent that it granted to the joint venture an 
exemption limited to eight years.62  In the other cases, where the CFI itself refers explicitly to 
the term ‘essential facilities’, it does so without further clarifying the content thereof, usually in 
the context of some obiter dictum.63  
1.1.2. At the member States level 
Magill and the subsequent case law, combined with the ongoing liberalisation of 
telecommunications, gave rise to significant litigation at the national level.  
One first issue which came to be judged by the national courts and competition authorities 
concerned the right to publish and/or use listings of the telephone subscribers of incumbent 
companies. In a controversial judgment, SFR v. France Télécom,64 the Paris Court of Appeal 
held that the complete list of subscribers of the incumbent operator (comprising also those 
whose numbers were held secret) constituted an essential facility.65 Hence, the incumbent 
                                                          
58 Above, n. 31. 
59 European Night Services above n 27. 
60 For the decision of the Commission see above, 1.1.1.1 Commission practice. 
61 Note that this was an Art 81 case – a decision as to the existence of dominance was necessary in order to assess 
the Article 81(3) conditions that the Commission had imposed upon the undertakings by virtue of the essential 
facilities doctrine. 
62 In fact, the CFI annulled the Commission decision because it had failed to prove that the agreement hindered 
competition at all. However, the CFI made it clear that (para 230) ‘even if it is assumed that the Commission's 
assessment of the restrictions on competition in the contested decision was adequate and correct … the length of 
time required to ensure a proper return on that investment [necessary to economic progress and consumers’ welfare] 
is necessarily an essential factor to be taken into account when determining the duration of an exemption, particularly 
in a case such as the present, where it is undisputed that the services in question are completely new, involve major 
investments and substantial financial risks and require the pooling of know-how by the participating undertakings’. 
63 These cases are: SNCF & BRB v. Commission above n 27; Case T-102/96 Gencor v. Commission above n 1; 
Aéroports de Paris v. Commisssion above n 23; Case T-112/99 Metropole Television [2001] ECR II-2459; Case T-
52/00 Coe Clerici Logistics v. Commission [2003] ECR II-2123; T-158/00 ARD v Commission (BSkyB) [2003] nyr. 
64 CA Paris, 1 sept. 1998, SFR v. France Télécom, RG 98/12345, Dalloz Affaires, n° 133, 8-10-98, 1559. 
65 It is questionable whether this is a proper application of the essential facilities doctrine, since competition in the 
French telecommunications market was already fierce, at the time when access to the directory was asked for. 
Furthermore, the solution reached by the Paris Court of Appeal runs against the logic of the telecom directives, in 
particular Directive 98/10/EC on universal service, under which each operator (also the incumbent) is compelled to 
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could not use this listing for its own advertisement,without allowing its competitors to have 
equal access to it. The same logic prevailed in the decision of the Italian Competition 
Authority in Sign/Stet-Sip,66 on a basis of facts very similar to those prevailing in Magill. The 
telecom incumbent (Sip) and its mother company (Stet) held exclusive rights over the listings 
of their subscribers and, despite the existence of public demand to this effect, refused to 
publish them in electronic form, either in the form of CD ROMs or online. They were 
compelled to allow others to offer such a new product into the market. This decision by the 
Italian Autorità came some months after it had acknowledged, for the first time, the existence 
of the doctrine of essential facilities, in Telesystem v. SIP,67 concerning access to the fixed 
telecommunications network of the incumbent. In Belgium, in Belgacom v. Kapitol Trading, 
the Commercial Tribunal of Brussels, held that the incumbent operator could not prevent third 
parties wishing to publish CD ROMs with the telephone listings from publishing them, despite 
the fact that they were the subject of an IPR.68 A similar issue, but with the difference that in 
the meantime the 1998 ONP Directive had come into effect,69 arose in the Netherlands. The 
Directive (art. 6 (3)) expressly provides that incumbents ‘meet all reasonable requests to 
make available the relevant information in an agreed format on terms which are fair, cost 
oriented and non-discriminatory’. KPN’s competitors were requesting access not merely to the 
basic information, but also to additional information compiled by KPN (concerning the 
profession, the existence of other phone numbers, etc). In a preliminary ruling the ECJ held 
that such a disclosure of information did not stem from the Directive itself, nor from any other 
source.70
A second field of extensive litigation concerns airports and linked facilities. In Héli-Inter 
Assistance the French Conseil de la Concurrence,71 upheld by the Paris Court of Appeal,72 
held that a heliport within Paris was an essential facility for the provision of first aid and 
rescue services. Therefore, its owner, which itself offered such services was compelled to 
give access to the heliport to competitors in this downstream market.73 In De Montis v. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
communicate to other entities wishing to edit telephone directories only the ‘non-reserved’ numbers; see in this 
respect ECJ Case C-146/00 Commission v. France, Universal Service [2001] ECR I-9767, para 67-68.  
66 Decision of 26-27 April 1995, Sign/Stet-Sip, Boll. Autorità conc. e mercato, n. 17/1995, 5. 
67 Decision of 1995, Telesystem v. Sip, Boll. Autorità conc. e mercato, n. 1-2/1995, 5. 
68After this decision Belgacom started giving licences to its listings, but against an exorbitant fee. A Dutch Company 
ITT Promedia NV, complained to the EC Commission and eventually the case was settled with the incumbent 
agreeing on a fee almost 90% lower than the initial fee, see Commission Press Release of 11 April 1997, IP/97/292. 
For further applications of the doctrine in Belgium see E. Vegis ‘La théorie des « essential facilities » : genèse d’un 
fondement autonome visant des interdictions d’atteinte à la concurrence ?’, RDC/TBH (1999) 4. 
69 Directive 98/10/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 1998 on the application of open 
network provision (ONP) to voice telephony and on universal service for telecommunications in a competitive 
environment, OJ (1998) L 101/ 24.
70 Case KPN Telekom v Opta, above n 55. On the issue of the possible application of the essential facilities doctrine 
in sector-regulated fields, such as the telecommunications see below 1.2.1.3. Elimination of competition 
71 Cons.Conc. Déc. 96-D-51, 3 sept. 1996, BOCCRF 8-1-97, 3. 
72 CA Paris, 9 sept. 1997, BOCCRF 7-10-97, 692. 
73 For this and other cases in which the French Conseil de la Concurrence and jurisdictions have discussed and/or 
applied the doctrine of essential facilities see M Thill-Tayra & C Couadou, ‘Le droit d’accès à l’épreuve de la théorie 
des installations essentielles’ (5/1999) Contrats – Concurrence – Consommation, , 4. 
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Aeroporti di Roma,74 the Italian Autorità ordered the defendant to allow competitive catering 
companies to have access to the ramps, etc of the airport. More recently, in Aeroporti di 
Roma/Tariffe di Groundhandling 75 the Italian Authority applied the essential facilities doctrine 
in order to assess whether the fee system imposed by the airport to undertakings offering 
groundhandling services constituted an abuse of a dominant position.76 The Frankfurt 
Oberlandesgericht faced a similar issue, in a dispute between the airport of Hannover and 
Lufthansa. The point that distinguishes this case from previous airport cases is that Directive 
96/67/EC on groundhandling had entered into force in the meantime.77 This Directive 
provides for a fee to be paid by the users of airport facilities. The question which arose was 
whether on top of this ‘usage fee’, the facility holder was also allowed to charge an ‘access 
fee’, presumably stemming from general competition rules and the doctrine of essential 
facilities (the facility holder invoked the Commission decision in Aéroports de Paris in this 
respect). The Court denied the existence of such a right, but held that nothing ‘prevent[s] the 
fee from being determined in such a way that the managing body of the airport is able not 
only to cover the costs associated with the provision and maintenance of airport installations, 
but also to make a profit.’78
In a field with which EU competition lawyers are by now highly familiar, the French Conseil de 
la Concurrence rejected a plea under the essential facilities doctrine concerning the refusal of 
Apple to grant a license to one of its competitors for the electronic platform which allows 
digital music to be downloaded, transferred and played by a piece of hardware patented by 
Apple, the iPod.79 The similarities between this case and the European Microsoft case are 
evident. However, in contrast to Microsoft, Apple was not found dominant in any of the 
possible relevant markets: (a) the market for the technologies which allow the distinctive 
encoding and downloading of music, especially since Microsoft’s Media Player tends to 
dominate this market, b) the market for portable music players, since other ‘flash’ players 
occupy an important part of the market and c) the market for downloaded music. Hence, the 
case was dropped. 
Further (attempted) applications of the essential facilities doctrine may easily be identified in 
the practice of the competent authorities and jurisdictions of member states.80 The existence 
of such a ‘trend’ within member states does not in itself mean that there is an EU doctrine of 
                                                          
74 Decision of 2 March 1995, De Montis Catering Romα v. Aeroporti di Roma, Boll. Autorità conc. e mercato, n. 
9/1995, 5. 
75 Decision of 20 November 2000, Aeroporti di Roma / Tariffe di Groundhandling, Boll. Autorità conc. e mercato, n. 
38/2000 and http://www.agcm.it .
76 For a thorough discussion of the Italian experience of the essential facilities doctrine see M Siragusa & M Beretta, 
‘La dottrina delle essential facilities nel diritto comunitario ed italiano della concorrenza’ (1999) Contrato e impressa, 
Europa, 260. 
77 Directive 96/67/EC, on access to the groundhandling market at Community airports, OJ 1996 L 272, 36.
78 Case Flughafen Hannover-Langenhagen above n 55, para 56. 
79 Conseil de la Concurrence, Décision n° 04-D-54 of 9 November 2004, available at http://www.conseil-
concurrence.fr/pdf/avis/04d54.pdf . See on this decision G Mazziotti, ‘Did Apple’s refusal to license proprietary 
information enabling interoperability with its iPod music player constitute an abuse under Article 82 of the EC Treaty’ 
(2005) Berkeley Center of Law and Technology, paper 5/2005.  
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essential facilities. It may, nevertheless, constitute an important indication that such a doctrine 
does exist . 
1.2. The content of the doctrine 
From the developments of the previous subsection (1.1) it becomes clear that the courts and 
competition authorities, both at the EU and the member state level, tend to reason in a 
specific way, when faced with cases where the use of some essential infrastructure or facility 
is at stake. The adoption of a specific pattern in the case law seems to argue in favour of the 
existence of a doctrine.81 It is, therefore, crucial to examine the conditions for the application 
of such a doctrine (1.2.1), as well as the consequences thereof (1.2.2). 
1.2.1. Conditions for the application of the doctrine  
No attempt to define the contents of an EU essential facilities doctrine can succeed without 
addressing: a) the definition given by the Commission in the first decision in which the 
doctrine was applied 82 and, more importantly b) the definition given by Advocate General 
Jacobs in his opinion in Oscar Bronner. 83 The Advocate General states that  
according to that doctrine a company which has a dominant position in the provision of 
facilities which are essential for the supply of goods or services in another market abuses its 
dominant position where, without objective justification, it refuses access to those facilities. 
Thus, in certain cases, a dominant undertaking must not merely refrain from anti-competitive 
action but must actively promote competition by allowing potential competitors access to the 
facilities which it has developed.84
From the definition given above, the scope of the EU essential facilities doctrine may be 
defined by reference to seven (plus one implicit) elements. 
1.2.1.1. A facility 
The nature and characteristics of the facility which may justify the application of the doctrine is 
a topic of argument and dissent among writers. According to the more restrictive view, only 
infrastructure which is objectively bulky, costly or else very difficult to duplicate could justify 
the application of the doctrine. These conditions would be satisfied by fixed infrastructure, 
such as ports, airports, railway stations and material networks (e.g. the electricity grid or 
natural gas pipeline) and, only exceptionally, by intangible networks (e.g. radio frequencies, 
                                                                                                                                                                      
80 See, for each separate country, the articles referred to above. 
81 Of course, the strengths and weaknesses of this proposition are going to be tested in Section 2 of the present 
Chapter. 
82 Sea Containers/Stena Sealink, above n 13, paras 66-67. 
83 Opinion delivered in Case 7/97 Oscar Bronner [1998] ECR I-7791, para 34. 
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distribution networks etc).85 Such a restrictive view accounts for the vast majority of cases in 
which the Commission applied the essential facilities doctrine to ‘natural monopolies’.86 
Moreover, it is corroborated by the terminology used in several countries: in French the term 
used instead of ‘facilities’ is the more restrictive ‘installations’,87 while in other languages the 
term ‘infrastructures’ is also used.88
However, such a restrictive definition of the term ‘facility’ does not account for all the case law 
of the Commission and, more importantly, that of the Court. For, in Magill, the Court ordered 
access to be given to TV listings. Similarly, in Ladbroke the CFI implicitly admitted that the 
race images could qualify as a ‘facility’, but rebutted the argument that they were ‘essential’ 
for the market of bookmaking. In Oscar Bronner, which clearly stands for a restrictive 
approach to the doctrine, the ECJ was ready to accept that a private distribution network for 
newspapers may constitute a facility, but was not convinced that, in this given case, it was 
‘essential’. More importantly still, in IMS Health89 the Court held that the (protected) logic 
structure of a database could constitute an essential facility and instructed the national court 
to order compulsory licensing thereto, subject to the proviso that the information thus obtained 
would be used by the competitors in order to bring to the market a new product.90 Last but not 
least, in Microsoft, the Commission deemed a PC operational system to be essential and 
ordered interface information to be delivered to competitors. The Commission also ordered an 
interim injunction to this effect, which Microsoft sought to have suspended by the ECJ. The 
President of the CFI, in a lengthy Order (of no less than 478 paragraphs) delivered in 
December 2004, rejected Microsoft’s action.91
In view of the above practice, it is really difficult to argue convincingly that only ‘heavy’ and 
‘one off’ pieces of infrastructure, such as airports, are contemplated by the doctrine. 
Moreover, in an era of privatisation and market liberalisation, where access to the majority of 
fixed infrastructures is regulated by extensive secondary legislation, a restrictive definition of 
the term ‘facility’ would hardly leave any scope for the doctrine. At most, this would confine 
                                                                                                                                                                      
84 What Mr. Jacobs omits to mention is that the undertaking giving access to the facility is entitled to receive a just 
access fee. 
85 See among others, V Korah, ‘The interface between intellectual property and antitrust: the European experience’ 
above n 47; R Pilliteri, ‘La Corte di Giustizia circonscrive rigorosamente I confini di applicazione della c.d. « essential 
facilities doctrine » nella repression dell’ abuso di posizione dominante’ above n 48. 
86 For which see below 2.1.1.2. A doctrine or just a legislative pattern?. 
87 See M Thill-Tayra & C Couadou ‘Le droit d’accès …, above, n 67. 
88 In view of the semantic difference of the terms used, most writers prefer to use the English terminology, 
irrespective of the language in which they are writing; see for Italian Pillitteri, above, Siragusa & Beretta, above n 76,  
and S Bastianoni, ‘A proposito della dottrina delle essential facilities, Tutela della concorrenza o tutela dell’iniziativa 
economica’ (1999) Mercato Concorrenza Regole 149; G Moglia & D Durante, ‘Le essential facility e la creazione di 
nuovi mercati concorrenziali: recenti sviluppi tra antitrust e regolamentazione’ (1999) Concorenza e mercato 299; for 
Spanish Gippini-Fournier; for French (Belgian) Vegis, cited in the previous notes; and for Greek, V Hatzopoulos, The 
essential facilities doctrine in EU and Greek Competition Law (Athens, Sakkoulas, 2002). 
89 Case C-418/01 IMS Health [2004] nyr, for which see the comment by the present author in (2004) CML Rev 1613. 
90 For the “new product” requirement see below 1.2.1.5. The requirement that the facility be used for a ‘new’ product . 
91 Case T-201/04 R Microsoft e.a v. Commission [2004] nyr. 
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the doctrine to a mere interpretative instrument of acts of secondary legislation,92 or to a 
complement thereto.93  Such an outcome would hardly be satisfactory, for at least two 
reasons. First, it is not clear to what extent general competition rules – and especially the 
essential facilities doctrine – should apply to sector-regulated industries.94 Second, such a 
restrictive vision of what constitutes a ‘facility’ would be self-defeating, since the role of any 
legal doctrine is primarily the formulation of general principles, covering situations for which 
there is no specific rule, or serving as the background against which specific rules are to be 
adopted.95 Such a restrictive attitude, which would deprive the competition enforcement 
authorities of a useful instrument,96 does not seem to be embraced by the EU Institutions.  
1.2.1.2. Essential  
According to the Commission, a facility is essential  
if without access there is, in practice, an insuperable barrier to entry for competitors of the 
dominant company, or if without access competitors would be subject to a serious, permanent 
and inescapable competitive handicap which would make their activities uneconomic.97  
The ECJ in Oscar Bronner made it plain that the existence of an ‘insuperable barrier’ is 
understood in an abstract and absolute way. That is, not in relation to the capacities of a 
particular competitor actually seeking access to the facility, but taking into account the 
financial, technical and other resources that could be brought to bear by a hypothetical 
competitor. In other words, the Court in Bronner held that any compulsory access 
requirement, should aim at the preservation of competition¸ not the protection of competitors. 
This means that, in any given market, the same facilities will qualify as ‘essential’ for all the 
undertakings involved. The test is an objective one, according to the criteria set out below and 
                                                          
92 See, for a case where the doctrine is applied as a means of interpretation of the rules on telecommunications, 
Case C-79/00 Telefonica de Espana [2001] ECR I-10057. 
93 See Commission Decision 2003/707/EC of 21 May 2003, Deutsche Telekom, OJ [2003] L 263/9, for an instance 
where the Commission held that the high access fees charged by Deutsche Telekom to its competitors constituted a 
violation of Art. 82 EC, despite the fact that the access tariffs had been approved by the national regulatory authority, 
in conformity with the applicable directives. Geradin makes the point that the application of general competition rules, 
such as Art. 82 EC and the essential facilities doctrine, on top of sector-specific regulation may be a useful 
instrument for keeping the sectors concerned running smoothly. Compare J Temple Lang, ‘European Competition 
Policy and Regulation: Differences, overlaps and constraints’, paper delivered at the 3d Antitrust Conference 
organised by the CERNA (Ecole des Mines, Paris) and BCLT (Berkeley University) in January 2006, available at 
http://www.cerna.ensmp.fr/cerna_regulation/Documents/Antitrust2006/Temple-Lang.pdf, who claims that there 
should be as little interaction as possible between regulated markets on the one hand, and mainstream competition 
law on the other. 
94 For which see below 1.2.1.3. Elimination of competition 
95 At this stage of the analysis we take for granted that a doctrine of essential facilities does exist and we are trying to 
sketch out its precise content. In the second part of the present contribution we will try to answer the more 
fundamental question whether such a doctrine should exist at all. 
96 For the usefulness of the essential facilities doctrine in relation to the existing competition rules, see below 2.1.1.1 
Differences between essential facilities and ‘classic’ competition rules. 
97 Report by the EC Commission in OECD/GD(96)113, The Essential Facilities Concept, 97, available at 
http://www.olis.oecd.org/olis/1996doc.nsf/LinkTo/OCDE-GD(96)113 . 
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does not take into account the particularities of every (potential) competitor.98 The facility 
must be:  
i) Unique or, at least, very difficult to duplicate. In this respect, the existence of technical, 
economic, legal, etc insuperable obstacles is taken into account. Duplication is deemed to be 
impossible when the cost or the time required is exorbitant,99 when the market is totally 
indisposed to switch to the use of a new facility,100 when IPRs or other regulatory obstacles 
stand in the way of the competitors,101 etc. Duplication is to be assessed in a given time and 
re-assessed periodically, as technological progress or other developments may allow for the 
creation of substitutes to once ‘unique’ facilities.102
ii) Absolutely necessary to anyone wishing to enter the relevant market. In this respect, the 
cross-elasticity of the goods/services based on the facility is to be considered, in relation to 
alternative goods/services which are not based on the facility. Moreover, the existence of 
substitutes to the facility (even imperfect) must be taken into account.103 Substitutability is to 
be assessed in a broader sense than the one usually followed for determining the relevant 
product market.104
iii) Absolutely necessary to anyone wishing to enter the relevant market (i.e. the hypothetical 
ideal competitor). In this respect, the weaknesses (technical, financial, organizational etc) of 
the particular competitor requiring access to the facility, may be taken into account in order to 
offset any of the above two criteria. Or, conversely, if any of the above two conditions is 
satisfied because of some competitive failure of the potential entrant, then the facility is not in 
itself ‘essential’.  
1.2.1.3. Elimination of competition 
a) General: how much competition is enough? 
                                                          
98 A different question is whether the very competitor seeking access to the facility is himself ‘essential’ to 
competition, in the sense that his entry into the relevant market will substantially increase competition. 
99 See Case European Night Services above n 27. 
100 See Case IMS Health v NDC Health, above n 37. 
101 See the case law concerning intellectual property rights, above 1.1.1.1 Commission practice and below 2.1.2.4. 
The existence of IPRs; see also the Commission decision in ICG/Morlaix, above n 17. 
102 The most striking example here is telecommunications, where wireless and satellite networks provide for realistic 
substitutes to the fixed network, once thought of as being essential.  
103 See above n 51. This aspect of the judgment has been criticised by D Neven & P Mavroidis, ‘The interface…’ 
above n 50. These writers argue that making the duty to deal contingent upon the absence of an inferior substitute is 
economically unsound, since in such circumstances the owner of the facility would not object to dealing with third 
parties, while, on the contrary, he would be more tempted to object where there are some inferior substitutes. 
Therefore, depending on the general contractual environment (flexibility, observability, etc of the contracts) of the 
Member State concerned this condition may be source of any or both of the errors below: a) impose a policy 
intervention which is not necessary and b) more seriously, fail to impose a policy intervention which is necessary to 
ensure consumer’s welfare. 
104 In this respect it is noteworthy that the Court in Bronner, first held that the market for home delivered newspapers 
was a distinct market in which Mediaprint was dominant, but then found that substitutes to such a system of 
distribution (albeit of an inferior quality) did exist and therefore the distribution network was not ‘essential’. This 
remark is also made by E Gippini-Fournier, ‘“Essential facilities” y applicacion del articulo 82 …’ above n 48, and D 
Neven & P Mavroidis ‘The Interface…’ above n 48. 
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The corollary of the requirement that the facility be essential is that it must serve for the 
maintenance of competition in the downstream markets, to the benefit of consumers.  
As stated above, what is important is not the safeguarding of any particular competitor, but of 
competition as such. This entails an analysis of cross-substitutability of the goods/services 
offered in the downstream market with others which a) are based on alternative facilities or b) 
use different means to achieve comparable results. Then, the question arises, when does that 
the foreclosure of competition become serious enough to justify the application of the 
essential facilities doctrine? 
Article 82 EC, to start with, does not require a total absence of all competition, but merely 
‘limiting production’ to the ‘prejudice of consumers’.  
The Court, for its part, in Bronner, referred itself back to the judgments in Commercial 
Solvents, CBEM and Magill and found that all those ‘precedents’ were based on the 
assumption that the refusal to supply would eliminate all competition in the downstream 
market.105 Similarly in IMS Health the Court held that the refusal would be abusive if it were 
‘such as to exclude any competition’.106
The Commission, on the other hand, in Microsoft, makes use of a more flexible criterion, 
consisting of the ‘risk of elimination of competition’107 and the need to ensure that any 
competitor can ‘viably stay in the market’.108
Despite these differences in wording, the overall practice of the EC Institutions seems to be 
imposing a duty to licence only when it is clear that the refusal to deal results in the 
substantial elimination of competition. This would occur each time that dominance in the 
upstream market would also lead to dominance in the downstream market. ‘In most cases, 
however, a small number of reasonably efficient rivals should be enough to make the market 
reasonably competitive’.109
b) Application of the doctrine in sector-regulated markets? 
A further question is to what extent, if at all, the essential facilities doctrine should be applied 
in sector-regulated markets, such as telecommunications, energy, rail transport, etc.  
In this respect the US Supreme Court in Trinko seems to be following the idea that where ‘a 
regulatory structure designed to deter and remedy competition harm exists’ there will be little 
                                                          
105 Bronner above n 48, paras 40-41. 
106 IMS Health v NDC Health above n 32, para 38. 
107 Note that the words ‘all’ or ‘any’ are not there and that the word ‘risk’ is added. 
108 Microsoft above n 38, paras 779-784. 
109 For the quotation as well as for the overall assessment contained in this very last paragraph see R O’Donoghue & 
JA Padilla, The Law and Economics of Article 82 EC (Oxford/Portland, Hart Publishing, 2005) Ch. 8 at 29-30. 
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scope left for anti-trust intervention. There are, however several reasons why in the EU the 
opposite solution seems preferable, not least because the existence of secondary legislation 
may not set aside the direct application of the Treaty rules on competition. Other reasons 
include the fact that a) the instruction of cases by the EC Commission is much less time-
consuming than antitrust adjudication in the US, b) EC directives tend to be less precise and 
more open-ended than US legislative acts, and c) sector-specific regulators and agencies 
have a longer tradition of independence and are less likely to be ‘captive’ in the US than in the 
EU. 110
The Commission clearly holds that it may intervene and apply the Treaty rules on sector-
regulated industries. This was made apparent in its decision in Deutsche Telekom,111 where 
the Commission held that the high access fees charged by the incumbent monopolist to its 
competitors for access to its local telecommunications network constituted a violation of Art. 
82 EC. This, despite the fact that the access tariffs had been approved by the national 
regulatory authority, in conformity with the applicable ONP directives. 
This Commission decision may be said to be drawing on the Court’s earlier judgment in 
Telefonica.112 In this case the Court held that the Royal Decree transposing into Spanish law 
the ‘interconnection/Open Network Provision (ONP)’ Directive 97/33113 was legal, despite the 
fact that it exceeded the terms of the Directive. In fact, the Decree gave to the National 
Regulatory Authority (NRA) not only the right to encourage and support but also to impose on 
the incumbent the conclusion of interconnection agreements. Hence, it could be said that the 
Court found that, next to the specific ONP requirements stemming from the Directive, other 
more general competition rules founded the right of intervention of the NRA. 
More recently, however, in KPN Telekom v Opta and Flughafen Hannover,114 the Court did 
not seem to favour the application of general competition principles on top of sector-specific 
regulation. It is true that, contrary to Deutsche Telekom and Telefonica, in these two more 
recent cases there was no indication that the application of sector-specific rules was deficient 
or else failing. Hence, it is not clear whether these cases indicate that the Court will, as a 
general rule, resist the application of the essential facilities doctrine in sector-regulated 
industries, or whether it will do so only when the sectoral rules are properly into place and 
fully complied with.115
                                                          
110 For a full conversation of the merits of the Trinko approach in the EU context see D Geradin, ‘Limiting the Scope 
of Article 82 EC…’ above n 7, 1546 et seq. 
111 Commission Decision 2003/707/EC of 21 May 2003, Deutsche Telekom, OJ [2003] L 263/9. 
112 Case C-79/00 Telefonica de Espana [2001] ECR I-10057. 
113 Directive 97/33/EC of the EP and the Council of 30 June 1997, OJ [1997] L 199/32.  
114 Both discussed above at 1.1.2. At the member States level. 
115 Geradin makes the point that the application of general competition rules, such as Art. 82 EC and the essential 
facilities doctrine, on top of sector-specific regulation may be a useful instrument for keeping the sectors concerned 
running smoothly. Compare J Temple Lang, ‘European Competition Policy and Regulation: Differences, overlaps and 
constraints’ above n 93, who claims that there should be as little interaction as possible between regulated markets, 
on the one hand and mainstream competition law, on the other. 
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1.2.1.4. The distinction between the market of the facility and an ancillary market for 
which the facility is indispensable  
a) The traditional / formalistic view 
According to the traditional expression of the essential facilities doctrine, a fundamental 
distinction should be drawn between, on the one hand, the market of the facility itself and, on 
the other hand, an ancillary market for which access to the facility is essential: in the former 
market the owner of the essential facility is, by definition, dominant,116 while he should allow 
competitors to enter in the latter market. It is not clear whether the owner of the facility should 
also be dominant, or even present, in the secondary market.117 In the production chain, the 
essential facility can be, in relation to the secondary market, upstream (e.g. a port for the 
provision of transport services), downstream (e.g. the grid for the transport and distribution of 
electricity) or parallel (e.g. the patented software which is necessary to operate a computer). 
b) The more elliptic / realistic view 
According to an increasing number of writers, the above distinction between two clearly 
defined markets is only notional, often fictitious and without economic significance. It is 
therefore irrelevant for the application of the essential facilities doctrine.118 These writers 
stress that the market of the essential facility is often of minor economic importance in relation 
to the secondary market,119 that there is no market for the essential facility at all,120 or that, at 
any rate, such a market is not distinguishable, in economic terms, from the secondary 
market.121 Therefore, they argue that it is unreasonable to try to identify an abuse in a non-
existent primary market or in one of no economic weight, in order to interfere in an ‘ancillary’ 
market of great economic importance. What matters is that if the owner of the facility gave 
access to it to any competitor, the parties would compete in the same final market. Such a 
rule, simplistic as it may appear, is perfectly consistent with the policy reasons underlining the 
                                                          
116 If he is not dominant in the market of the facility then the doctrine may not apply, see European Night Services 
above n 27, and the relevant developments above, para. 1.1.1.2. The CFI/ECJ. 
117 In this respect the European version of the doctrine clearly differs from its American counterpart, in that it does not 
require dominance – or even presence – in the secondary market; see below 2.1.1.2. A doctrine or just a legislative 
pattern? and, in more detail 2.2.1.2. Conditions for the application of the doctrine. See also J Venit & J Kallaugher, 
‘Essential Facilities: A Comparative Law Approach’ (1994) 21st Annual Fordham Corporate Law Institute 315, 333. 
118 See F Denozza, ‘Refusal to Deal and IPRs’, (typeset) minutes of the Conference on «Antitrust Between EC Law 
and National Law», 16-17 May 2002, Treviso, Italy; R Pitofsky, ‘The essential Facilities Doctrine Under US Antitrust 
Law,’ available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments /intelpropertycomments/ pitofskyrobert.pdf; F Fine, ‘NDC/IMS: A 
Logical Application of the Essential Facilities Doctrine’ above n 36; and I Forrester, ‘Compulsory Licensing in Europe: 
a Rare Cure to Aberrant National Intellectual Property Rights,’ paper presented at the US Department of 
Justice/Federal Trade Commission Hearings on Competition and Intellectual Property Law and Policy in the 
Knowledge-Based Economy: Comparative Law Topics, May 22, 2002, published in October 2002 in English in the 
Chinese International Business Daily (web edition, not available online any more).  
119 Such is the case e.g. for airways, for which the computerized reservation systems are of no value compared to the 
market of air transport itself. 
120 Such was the case in Magill above n 28 for the daily TV listings. 
121 Such was the case in Tiercé Ladbroke above n 31 for the race images which were only important for the betting 
market; the same applies to interface information relating to copyrighted software – it may be sold separately but its 
economic value lies with the copyrighted product they relate to. 
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essential facilities doctrine, i.e. preserve competition at each phase of production, whether 
defined as a separate market or not. ‘The policy concern is simply to ensure competition in 
the market where two parties could compete but for the refusal to provide access to the 
essential asset; any characterization of the essential facility would be superfluous and 
artificial’.122 This view is corroborated by a long series of US applications of the doctrine.123 
Further, it accords with one of the first definitions of the doctrine given by the Commission.124  
The Court took a position on this issue in its judgment in IMS Health. In that case, one of the 
main arguments put forward by the holder of the intellectual property right was that ‘the 
essential facility doctrine cannot require the dominant undertaking to share with other 
operators an intellectual property right solely in order to allow the latter to compete with it 
more effectively on the same market on which it is exploiting its right’.125  The Court made 
three successive statements in this respect: 
43. The fact that the [required good or service] was not marketed separately [is not to be] 
regarded as precluding, from the outset, the possibility of identifying a separate market  
44.  …it is sufficient that a potential market or even hypothetical market can be identified.  
Such is the case where the products or services are indispensable in order to carry on a 
particular business and where there is an actual demand for them on the part of undertakings 
which seek to carry on the business for which they are indispensable’. 
45. Accordingly, it is determinative that two different stages of production may be identified 
and that they are interconnected, the upstream product is indispensable in as much as for 
supply of the downstream product.  
 
Some authors view this as a confirmation of the requirement that two different markets need 
exist, although they are at pains explaining how this should actually be done.126 To the eyes 
of the present and other authors, however, there is a clear slippage from the requirement of 
there being ‘two separate markets’ to one which is satisfied each time that ‘different stages of 
production’ and demand, by third parties, for the outcomes of such production stages may be 
identified.127
                                                          
122 See Denozza above n 118, text corresponding to footnotes 24-25.  
123 Denozza, above n 118 and Pitofsky above n 118, para 5. 
124 In its Report by the EC Commission in OECD/GD(96)113 above n 97, 94, where the Commission puts forward the 
following formulation: ‘if without access there is, in practice, an insuperable barrier to entry for competitors of the 
dominant company, or if without access competitors would be subject to a serious, permanent and inescapable 
competitive handicap which would make their activities uneconomic.’ 
125 See para 35 of the opinion of AG Tizzano. 
126 See among many O’Donoghue & Padilla, above n 109 at 26, who argue in favour of a restrictive interpretation of 
the concept of ‘stage of production’ as corresponding to ‘something identifiably distinct, either in the literal sense of 
there being an intermediate product or in the sense of a separate input as a catalyst’. 
127 Hatzopoulos above n 88 at 1627 et seq, and Geradin above n 7 at 1530. 
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1.2.1.5. The requirement that the facility be used for a ‘new’ product 
In Magill and in the more mature and, thus, more authoritative judgment in IMS Health, the 
Court held that a refusal to grant a license would be abusive 128
… only where the undertaking which requested the licence does not intend to limit itself 
essentially to duplicating the goods or services already offered on the secondary market by 
the owner of the copyright, but intends to produce new goods or services not offered by the 
owner of the right and for which there is a potential consumer demand. 
Such a condition was not at all discussed in Bronner or in other cases not involving IPRs. 
Hence, almost all writers take the view that when the essential element is covered by some 
IPR, then this additional condition should also be satisfied. This point has raised great 
excitement in view of the ongoing Microsoft saga, precisely because the Commission’s 
Decision has failed to address the issue that Microsoft’s competitors needed Window’s 
interface information in order to compete with Microsoft in the market for work group servers – 
a market in which Microsoft was active.  
In a somehow heretical way, it is submitted that this ‘newness’ criterion does not make sense 
on its own (a) and may only be understood in relation to the requirement above, that two 
distinct markets need (not) necessarily be identified (b). 
 
a. The requirement that there be a ‘new’ product is unworkable and flawed. 
First, Advocate General Tesauro (among others), already before the judgment in IMS, had 
underlined the difficulty of deciding whether a product is innovative enough in order to qualify 
as being ‘new’ and not merely an improvement to previously existing products.129 The task is 
further complicated by the requirement implied in the excerpt of the judgment quoted above, 
that goods offered by the licensees, although ‘new’ should nonetheless be offered on the 
(same) secondary market as the goods of the facility/IPR owner. 
Second, the fact that the term ‘new’ does not have any ‘well received legal or economic 
definition’, thus allowing for some coherent application (such as e.g. the criterion of cross 
elasticity) has also been stressed.130 The idea, put forward by some authors, that ‘the new 
product should … be market-expanding rather than simply stealing share from existing 
products’131 is hardly compatible with the rationale of the essential facilities doctrine and, 
more generally, market liberalization and the abolition of monopolies: the desirability of the 
introduction of competition in previously monopolistic markets may not be conditional upon 
demand in this market being infinite – and it may be that the previous monopolist did satisfy 
all existing demand. More generally, competition law is not only about allowing consumers 
short-term benefits, but also about preserving and even stimulating (in the medium and long 
term) the competitive structure of the market. 
                                                          
128 IMS Health above n 37, para 49. 
129 G Tesauro, ‘The essential Facility Doctrine – Latest developments in EC Competition Law’ in EU Competition Law 
and Policy, (Athens, Hellenic Competition Commission/Nomiki Vivliothiki, 2002), 89. 
130 Geradin, above n. 53 at 1531. 
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Third, the very facts of the Microsoft case show the practical deficiencies of this criterion. In 
fact Microsoft’s competitors (notably Sun Microsystems) were already in the market for group 
work servers long before Microsoft decided to enter this market. In fact, Microsoft stopped 
providing ‘competitors’ with interface information only when it decided itself to enter the 
market in which they were already present. Then, is it that Sun and the others should change 
their own products in order for those to be ‘new’ in comparison with Microsoft’s copied 
product, or, on the contrary, is it that Microsoft should be left to use its IPRs in a primary 
market in which it is dominant in order to expel any competition from any secondary market it 
decides to penetrate? 
Last but not least, many writers criticize the fact that IPRs are treated in any different way 
than tangible property rights.132
 
b. The ‘new’ product requirement as an alternative to the existence of two separate markets 
It has been demonstrated above (1.2.1.4) that in IMS Health the Court accepted that the 
distinction between an upstream market (that of the essential facility or the IPR) and a 
downstream market (in which the holder of the facility is to compete with the new entrants) 
market need not be clearly established. Indeed, in IMS there was no separate market for the 
database brick structure and only IMS’ competitors could have wanted to have access to it. 
Similarly, in Magill, the Court only artificially identified a ‘market’ for daily TV listings while 
none, in fact, existed. In these two cases the Court introduces the condition that a ‘new’ 
product be marketed by competitors. That is, when the facility/IPR itself does not correspond 
to a good or service for which there is an actual market (in which case competitors would only 
have access the upstream facility/IPR in order to compete in the downstream market, 
according to the traditional analysis above at 1.2.1.4), the Court makes sure that the 
facility/IPR holder is not bothered by his competitors when marketing the good/product in 
which the facility/IPR is incorporated (by compelling the competitors to come up with a 
different product). This is not a peculiarity specific to IPRs (although it will often materialize in 
relation to IPRs, since rare are the IPRs which constitute markets on their own), but a 
particular expression of the idea that competitors should not be given access on the very 
same (primary) market of the facility/IPR holder, but rather on a severable one. Where two 
markets cannot be distinguished as such, then, at least, the requirement that newcomers 
introduce a product ‘different’ from the one produced with the facility/IPR is imposed, as a 
minimal protection of the interests of the facility/IPR holder. Where software programs are 
involved, the above idea means that an eventual license may only seek to achieve vertical – 
and not horizontal – interoperability.133
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
131 O’Donoghue & Padilla above n. 109 at 34. 
132 For the very rich literature on the topic see below, the notes in 2.1.2.4. The existence of IPRs . 
133 See above n 40 and the corresponding text. Note that if the preceding analysis is correct, then the Commission 
Decision in Microsoft is correct, since Microsoft’s IPRs relate to Windows, while the product for which they are going 
to be used by its competitors is different. 
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1.2.1.6. Unjustified refusal 
Refusal, by the holder of the facility, to allow competitors access may be direct or absolute. It 
may also be inferred by the imposition of illogical, exorbitant or otherwise unjustified 
conditions. Such conditions may be of an economic, technical or other nature.134 Refusal to 
grant access to an essential facility is in principle prohibited, but it may be justified. The 
reasons which may justify such a refusal must be objective and may not be technically and 
economically unsound, discriminatory or otherwise discretionary. Although the precise nature 
of such reasons is unclear,135 there is no doubt that, in the presence of an essential facility, a) 
it is for the holder of the facility to prove that his refusal to grant access to third parties is 
justified, b) according to objective criteria, subject to administrative and judicial control. 
Therefore, the position of the competitor who requires access is doubly facilitated, through a) 
the reversal of the burden of proof and b) the fact that the freedom of the holder of the facility 
(not) to deal is limited by reference to objective (i.e. not subjectively ill-defined commercial) 
criteria. It rests with the plaintiff, however, to prove that the facility is, indeed, essential; not an 
easy task following the judgment in Bronner. 
1.2.1.7. Conditions pertaining to the competitor seeking access 
Both the essential nature of a given facility and the possible justifications for a refusal to grant 
access thereto are considered against objective criteria. On the contrary, access itself may 
only be imposed on an intuitu personae basis. The competitor seeking access to the facility 
(which may also be referred to as ‘the plaintiff’) should fulfill two sets of conditions. 
First, the plaintiff should itself be essential for competition. This in turn, embraces two different 
conditions. The plaintiff should be an undertaking wishing to penetrate the relevant market 
itself, not an intermediary, broker, etc.136 Moreover, the plaintiff should possess the necessary 
resources other than the essential facility itself to create and maintain a reasonable market 
share within the relevant market. To impose an access obligation on the holder of the facility, 
in favour of a competitor who does not effectively strengthen competition, would counter the 
general principle of proportionality. Of course, this would not necessarily exclude small 
competitors from the scope of the doctrine, but would counter ‘rogue’ competitors from 
meddling with the dominant undertaking. 
                                                          
134 The conditions under which access should be granted are described with more precision in 1.2.2.1. Access to the 
facility under reasonable terms, below. 
135 Community legislation, which tends towards the liberalisation of the markets and embodies the essential facilities 
doctrine (see below 2.1.1.2. A doctrine or just a legislative pattern?), allows the incumbent operators to refuse or 
restrict access to their facility/network only for purely technical reasons. However, writers such as P Areeda,   
‘Essential Facilities: An Epithet in need of Limiting Principles’ (1990) Antitrust L.J. 841 and P Treacy, ‘Essential 
Facilities – Is the Tide Turning?’ (1998) ECLR 501, argue that legitimate commercial considerations may allow the 
facility owner to refuse access to its competitors. This latter view is indirectly corroborated by the judgment of the ECJ 
in Case 27/76 United Brands v. Commission [1978] ECR 207.  
136 Report by the EC Commission in OECD/GD(96)113 above n 97 at 99. 
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Second, the plaintiff must fulfil its obligations under the terms by which access is granted. 
This embraces both the periodic payment of the agreed or mandated access fee and all the 
other terms and conditions (such as technical specifications, kind of use, capacity, timetables, 
etc) attached to the granting of access to the facility. Such requirements may be freely agreed 
between the owner of the facility and its competitors or imposed upon them by the third party 
(competition authority, trustee or other) who will be defining and monitoring the access 
requirement.137
1.2.1.8. Issues ratione temporae 
Time matters to the application of the essential facilities doctrine, in three ways. First, over 
time a facility may cease to be essential.138 Second, where the facility is newly 
built/developed and financed by private resources, it may be sensible to impose access only 
after an initial period, during which the owner should be allowed to recoup his investment 
through monopoly profits.139 Third, in other occasions, access is being given for a limited 
period of time, allowing the competitor some leeway, in order to create his own 
infrastructure.140
1.2.1.9. Other factors – Is the list an exhaustive one? 
While in its decision in Microsoft, the Commission examines all the conditions set out in the 
Magill/Bronner/IMS Health case law and discussed above, it also puts forward a much more 
flexible test, upon which compulsory licensing could rest. This test, referred to as the 
‘balancing test’141 consists in weighing the facility/IPR owner’s incentives to innovate against 
‘the general public good’ as embodied in the competitor’s incentives to innovate and in 
consumer’s welfare. This test, although commended by some authors,142 is somehow 
problematic since it suffers from the recurrent ex post/ex ante divide and may be extremely 
open-ended, with unpredictable outcomes. 
The formulation of such a test in the Commission’s decision begs the more fundamental 
question, whether the ‘exceptional circumstances’ in which a facility holder may be compelled 
to allow competitors to use it (analytically set out above), are exhaustive. For instance, is the 
fact that Microsoft is not merely dominant, but super-dominant in the market of operating 
systems relevant at all? In this respect the Court has already judged in IMS Health that 
industry participation and outlay in the adoption of the protected structure did not constitute an 
                                                          
137 Similar requirements are extensively provided for in the various sectoral liberalization directives. 
138 See also above, para 1.2.1.2. Essential. 
139 A Overd & B Bishop, ‘Essential facilities : The rising Tide’ above n 47 at 183. In the same vein the CFI in 
European Night Services above n 27, annulled the Commission decision which limited the duration of the exemption 
given to the joint venture to only eight years. 
140 See e.g. British Midland v. Aer Lingus, Decision 92/213/ΕEC, OJ  L 96/34 (1992). 
141 See I Forrester, ‘The Interaction Between …’ above n 8 at 24. The same author is quite critical of this balancing 
test. 
142 F Lévêque, ‘Innovation, Leveraging and Essential Facilities: Interoperability Licensing in the EU Microsoft Case’ 
(2005) World Competition 71. 
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additional factor which should be evaluated on its own, but rather an element to be taken into 
account when assessing the abusive character of the refusal. This seems to be indicating 
that, for the sake of legal certainty, the conditions set out in the Magill/Bronner/IMS Health 
case law are exhaustive and that other factors should be taken into account only to the extent 
that they affect one of the ‘exceptional circumstances’ set out above. 
 
1.2.2. Consequences of the application of the doctrine  
Where the conditions for the application of the essential facilities doctrine are met, the 
competitor(s) should be granted access to the facility. However, this primary consequence 
may, in some circumstances, be completed by other complementary obligations imposed 
upon the holder of the facility. 
1.2.2.1. Access to the facility under reasonable terms 
a. Access 
The way in which access is ensured differs, depending on the nature of the facility. If the 
facility consists of a network, physical interconnection is the minimum requirement, while in 
value added networks (VANs) access to some basic services may also be required.143 
Similarly, where the facility consists of physical infrastructure (port, airport, etc) access may 
cover not only the infrastructure itself, but also ‘collateral’ facilities or services, indispensable 
for the proper use of the basic infrastructure.144 When the facility consists of an array of 
services (such as a distribution network), then access to some ‘basic services’ may be 
required. The same logic prevails where the facility consists of protected rights (such as 
IPRs), where access to the basic raw information, or even to mere interface information (the 
hooks on which competitive products may effectively hang up) not the end product (or 
operational software) is to be granted.145
b. Under reasonable terms 
What constitutes reasonable terms is decided on a case-by-case basis. The test here is 
simple to state: competitors should have access to the facility under the same terms as the 
holder himself.146 Applying the principle may prove delicate, especially in cases where the 
holder of the facility is strongly integrated, thus making it difficult to isolate the facility and to 
identify the conditions of its use. Moreover, on some occasions the holder of the facility may 
                                                          
143 See e.g. Directive 97/5/EC of the EP and the Council, of 27 January1997 on cross-border credit transfers, OJ L 
43/25 and Communication 95/C 251/03. Also Communication 98/C 265/02 concerning interconnection in the 
telecommunications sector. 
144 See the Commission decision and the CFI judgment in European Night Services, above n 27 on the use of rolling 
stock, personnel etc. 
145 On this issue the Microsoft saga is highly relevant, see above para 1.1.1.1 Commission practice 
146 See i.a. Β&Ι/Sealink above n 12 at 1.3.30. 
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be charged with public service or other contractual obligations, requiring him to make more 
intensive use of the facility than other competitors. It remains, however, the case that the 
owner should not obstruct, in any unjustified way, the access of the competitors to the facility. 
On the other hand, the competitor who is given access to the facility should [must?] also 
respect the obligation of reasonableness.147  
A very delicate issue, especially in the field of high technology networks and software, is that 
of normalization and interoperability. If the facility cannot interconnect or interface with the 
competitor’s applications, access to it is pointless. Two issues arise. First, the choice of 
technical specifications within any given market should strike a fine balance between, on the 
one hand, highly specialized ‘closed’ specifications, which are typically protected by 
intellectual property rights and, on the other hand, more generic ‘open’ specifications, which 
may allow for interconnection.148 Second, it is unclear whether an incumbent facility holder 
may bar access by the competitors by  arguing that the specifications used by them are far 
too developed for the facility, or whether, on the contrary, he should use his best endeavours 
to update his infrastructure.  
c. For a reasonable access fee 
The calculation of the fee due to the holder of the facility is one of the most abstruse issues of 
the doctrine of essential facilities and, indeed, one strong argument in the hands of those who 
oppose the judicial application of the doctrine.149  
Here too the principle is that competitors should be required to pay a fee which is both non-
discriminatory and reasonable. If the former condition is difficult to assess, especially in 
vertically integrated facilities,150 the latter condition calls for fierce theoretical debate. There 
are at least four different ways to work out the appropriate access fee for the holder of the 
facility. Starting from the least favourable for the holder of the facility, these are:  
i) The access fee only consists of the marginal cost linked to interconnection / 
physical access to the facility and/or of expenses necessary for the increased maintenance 
and repair requirements of the facility; 
                                                          
147 See in this respect, above, 1.2.1.5. The requirement that the facility be used for a ‘new’ product. 
148 The issue of interconnection and competition law is not a simple one, see among others, ACIS Comments on 
Draft Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing and Acquisition of Intellectual Property, at 
http://www.interop.org./Antitrust.html; the US/FTC report to the OECD in OECD/GD(96)113, The Essential Facilities 
Concept, 81; and more recently J Gray, ‘Antitrust and New Technologies: A View from the US’ (typeset) minutes of 
the Conference «Antitrust Between EC Law and National Law», Treviso, Italy, 16-17 May 2002. 
149 See B Doherty, ‘Just What Are Essential Facilities?’ (2001) CML Rev, 397, 431-433. 
150 It is also questionable whether it is a correct principle to apply, or whether the facility holder should be left free to 
negotiate individually with each new entrant and allow price differentiation depending on the size of the undertakings 
involved and on the way each one of them values the input in question; see F Lévêque, ‘Quel est le prix raisonnable 
d’une licence obligatoire?’ available at http://www.cerna.ensmp.fr/Documents/FL-RevueConcurrence.pdf  
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ii) In addition, the fee may also cover some return on the initial investment of the 
holder of the facility, thus allowing for the average total cost to be taken into account; 
iii) In addition to the above, the fee may also include some return on capital for the 
holder of the facility;151 
iv) The efficient component pricing rule, put forward by the US economists Baumol 
and Sidak,152 states that the facility holder may charge his competitors the total cost for the 
building, operation and maintenance of the facility, as it is incorporated in the prices of his 
own final products, minus the marginal cost of each unit produced by it. This allows the facility 
holder to transfer his own inefficiencies to his competitors, thus allowing only competition on 
the margin.153 
None of the above criteria provides a universal solution, as the circumstances of each case 
may call for a different approach. Naturally, figures coupled with varying accounting standards 
further complicate the matter.154  
In addition to these issues of intense theoretical debate, there is also a very important 
practical difficulty in determining the amount of a ‘reasonable’ fee. The real costs of the firm 
whose prices are being examined need to be taken into account. This may be impossible if 
the (administrative or judicial) authority which is to decide as to the fee is without a power to 
require “accounting separation,” i.e. rules to prevent the firm hiding certain costs and inflating 
others in its internal accounts. 
1.2.2.2. Complementary obligations of the facility holder 
Access may, in some circumstances, be devoid of substance if other, complementary, 
conditions are not satisfied. In this respect the EC Commission is more demanding than the 
US courts. The Commission requires the holder of the facility not merely to give access, but 
also to behave as if he were an independent third party or a public authority.155 This may, 
                                                          
151 This option seems to be favoured by the ECJ in case Flughafen Hanover, above at 1.1.2. At the member States 
level, where the Court acknowledged that the ‘usage fee’ that the airport authorities were authorized to charge to 
users of the facilities (air companies, groundhandlers, etc) could be calculated ‘in such a way that the managing body 
of the airport is able not only to cover the costs associated with the provision and maintenance of airport installations, 
but also to make a profit’ (para 56). This case concerned the application of a sector-specific directive (Directive 
96/67/EC on groundhandling services, [1996] OJ L 272/36) which, however, gave only general guidance concerning 
the calculation of the access fee.
152 W Baumol & G Sidak, Toward Competition in Local Telephony, (Cambridge (Mass.)/London, The MIT 
Press,1994).  
153 For a more detailed and critical analysis of the theory see N Economides & L White, ‘Access and Interconnection 
Pricing: How Efficient is the ‘Efficient Component Pricing?’ (1995) 3 Antitrust Bulletin 557, also available at 
http://www.stern.nyu.edu/networks/95-04.pdf . The Nobel Prize winning economist J Stiglitz is reported to have taken 
the view that ‘the theory is not well founded, it is well funded’. 
154 It is worth noting that in New Zealand, for the same access case, three different courts followed as many different 
formulas for the calculation of the “reasonable” access fee, see Telecom Corporation of NZ v. Clear Communications 
[1995] 1 NZLR, 385. 
155 See, the Commission’s report to the OECD above n 97 and J Temple Lang, ‘Defining Legitimate Competition: 
Companies duties to supply Competitors and Access to Essential Facilities’ (1994) 21st Annual Fordham Corporate 
Law Institute 245, 278. 
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depending on the circumstances, require the facility owner to satisfy one or more of the 
following requirements.156
i) Tariff transparency. The requirement for a non-discriminatory and reasonable 
access fees157 presupposes that the cost structure of the facility owner is ascertainable and 
rationally presented. This, in turn, may require more or less substantial unbundling of the 
various activities of the incumbent undertaking.158 
ii) Non-discrimination. Access fees are to be calculated without discrimination for all 
users159 and access granted according to objective criteria. In cases where the facility has 
limited capacity, the holder shall make an objective determination as to the optimal number of 
users and split fairly the available capacity between them (or the best among them, if they are 
outnumber availability).160 This may require the facility holder to proceed to a competitive 
tender.161  
iii) Proper management – maintenance – conservation of the facility, especially 
where it is of limited capacity, in order to accommodate the optimal number of competitors. 
This may require the facility holder to ensure the maintenance, rationalize the use, or even 
upgrade the facility.162 
iv) Information – coordination – obligation to act in good faith in respect of the other 
users of the facility. 
Some of the complementary obligations may prove, for the facility holder, as costly and even 
more burdensome than the obligation to give access itself. Such costs should be incorporated 
in the access fee and should be shared among the competitors. Moreover, any of the above 
obligations which require the undertakings to act in concert may fall foul of Article 81 EC. 
Therefore, such complementary obligations should be imposed with particular frugality. 
Furthermore, there is no doubt that the legislature will be in a better position than a judge to 
impose and set up a monitoring system for the above complementary obligations. 
                                                          
156 The principles outlined here are mostly based on the Commission report, above n 97, where it is perhaps easy to 
make general statements. It might be useful to examine how far these principles can be derived from actual decisions 
where the Commission had to examine real facts and take a position which was subject to the possibility of a court 
challenge. 
157 See above 1.2.2.1. Access to the facility under reasonable terms. 
158 See, among others, J Temple Lang, above n. 155 at 294. This solution has been extensively applied in legislation, 
see e.g. for rail transport, Directive 91/440/EEC of the Council of 29 June 1991, OJ L 237/25, as amended by 
Directive 2001/12/EC of the European Parliament and the Council, of 26 February 2001, OJ L 75/1, art. 6(2). 
159 This should not exclude bespoken arrangements, such as the use of the facility during certain time periods in 
exchange for a higher fee etc… 
160 Commission’s report to the OECD above n 97 at 99. Hence, in Sea Containers above n 13 and Port of Rødby, 
above n , the Commission held that the port’s capacity and the possible routes reasonably allowed for three 
competitors. See, more in detail on this issue Owen, B., Determining Optimal Access to Regulated Essential 
Facilities, Antitrust LJ 1990, p. 887. 
161 Ibid., at 102 and J Temple Lang, above n. 155, 294-295. See, however, B Doherty, above n 149,at 430, who 
argues that such a bidding system may not be fair and that any legislation requiring it might be void, since it would 
allow the dominant undertaking to chose its competitors. 
162 J Temple Lang, above n. 155 at 291. 
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2. Should there be an EU doctrine? 
In the first part of the present contribution we examined the case law of the EC Commission 
and courts where some essential facility was involved. We tried to identify the recurrent 
solutions which could be held to constitute an autonomous legal doctrine. In this second part 
we shall focus more on policy considerations and try to evaluate whether such a doctrine 
does, indeed, add to the existing armoury of EU competition law. 
2.1. A doctrine?  
The expression ‘essential facilities doctrine’ is derived from US law. Therefore, in the quest to 
understand whether in the EU there is such a thing as an essential facilities ‘doctrine’, the 
word ‘doctrine’ should be understood in its common law sense. 163 Hence, the term will not be 
used in the more Continental sense to describe the ‘analytically evaluative exposition of the 
substance of law’ consisting in ‘the interpretation and systematization of valid law’ or the 
‘description of the literal sense of statuses, precedents etc, intertwined with many moral and 
other substantive reason’.164 Instead, we will use the term legal ‘doctrine’ as consisting of 
propositions and assertions about the legal norms, in relation to hypothetical future decisions. 
The idea is that such assertions may allow  
a prediction to the effect that if an action in which the conditioning facts given in the section [of 
an Act] are considered to exist is brought before the courts …, and if in the meantime there 
have been no alterations in the circumstances which form the basis of [the assertion], the 
directive to the judge contained in the section will form an integral part of the reasoning 
underlying the judgment.165
In other words, we shall try to identify whether within EC law there is an intrinsically coherent 
and extrinsically systematic way of applying competition (and internal market?) rules, 
whenever in the presence of some facility which is deemed to be essential.  
 
2.1.1. Positive definition of the doctrine (scope) 
A large number of writers question the necessity for such an essential facilities doctrine. They 
argue that all cases dealt with under the doctrine could be better resolved - with the same 
result - under the ‘traditional’ competition rules.166 A further argument put forward is that a 
                                                          
163 The content of the term legal ‘doctrine’ has as many variants as the writers referring to it. An extensive discussion 
of what is a legal doctrine may not be carried out here, nor is the present author in a position to do so. Instead, two 
definitions broadly representative of the Continental and common law traditions are briefly presented, in order to 
provide the necessary elements for the apprehension of what constitutes a legal doctrine. 
164 See e.g. A Peczenik, ‘Can Philosophy Help Legal Doctrine’ (2004) Ratio Juris 106, at 106-107. 
165 See H Zahle, ‘Legal Doctrine Between Empirical and Rhetorical Truth. A Critical Analysis of Alf Ross’ Conception 
of Legal Doctrine’ (2003) European Journal of International Law 801, at 802, also referring to Alf Ross, On Law and 
Justice (London, Stevens, 1958, American edition by University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 
1959). 
166 See G Werden, ‘The Law and Economics of the Essential Facility Doctrine’ (1987) 32 St. Louis U.L.J. 433; 
Kezsbom & Goldman, ‘No Shortcut to Anti-trust Analysis: the twisted journey of the "essential facilities" doctrine’ 
(1996) Columbia Business Law Rev 602; E Vegis, ‘La théorie des « essential facilities » : genèse d’un fondement 
autonome visant des interdictions d’atteinte à la concurrence?’ (1999) RDC/TBH 4; B Doherty, ‘Just What Are 
Essential Facilities?’ above n 149. 
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rule requiring the holder of a facility to give access to his competitors should only be used in 
the deregulation of ‘natural’ monopolies and applied only by the legislature.167 Therefore, to 
speak of a ‘doctrine,’ i.e. a rule of general application, may be misleading. These two 
arguments merit some discussion. 
2.1.1.1 Differences between essential facilities and ‘classic’ competition rules  
From the case law presented above, it can be seen that the existence of an essential facility 
(whether physical or otherwise), often leads to the imposition of mandatory access. This 
happens, irrespective of whether the practice examined is a concerted practice,168 an abuse 
of a dominant position 169 or the creation of a joint venture.170 This observation does not, by 
itself, argue for the existence of an autonomous doctrine. It shows, however, that it is not 
correct to treat the problem of access to an essential facility as a mere subcategory of the 
‘refusal to supply’ abusive practice. 
Second, the essential facilities doctrine offers yet another instrument for the protection of 
competition. That is, Article 81 EC and the merger Regulation171 allow for ex ante preventive 
action, in order to preserve the competitive functioning and structure of the market. Article 82 
EC, on the other hand, allows only for ex post intervention, once the structure of the market is 
already weakened, as it reprimands abuse. The essential facilities doctrine, to the extent that 
it allows for an abuse to be ‘inferred’ whenever access to the essential facility is denied, could 
cover the intermediate space and allow the prevention – not merely redress – of actual 
abusive conduct in situations where the market structure is already weakened (because of the 
existence of the facility). Through the imposition of one or several contractual obligations on 
the dominant undertaking (holder of the facility), the doctrine aims at rendering such abuse 
impossible. 
Third, from the developments above, it follows that, where some essential facility is involved, 
the ‘traditional’ competition rules suffer some substantial alterations.  
i) The existence of a facility affects the definition of the relevant market: despite the 
dissonant voices of many writers,172 the facility is very likely to be held as an autonomous 
                                                          
167 See below 2.1.1.2. A doctrine or just a legislative pattern?. 
168 See e.g. the US cases Terminal Railroad above n 2, and Associated Press above n 3. See also the Commission 
in Eurotunnel above n 26. 
169 See e.g. the Commission’s decisions on ports and the ECJ judgments in Magill above n 28, Bronner  above n 48, 
and IMS  above n 37. 
170 See the Commission and the CFI in European Night Services above n 27. Moreover, the Commission has (directly 
or indirectly) applied the essential facilities doctrine in a series of other decisions under Regulation 4064/89, see e.g. 
Swissair/Sabena of 19 July 1995 (IV/M.616) ΕΕ L 239, 1995, 19, Mercedes-Benz/Kässbohrer of 14 February 1995 
(IV/M.477) OJ L 211, 1995, 1, Glaxo/Wellcome of 28 February 1995 (IV/M.555). 
171 Regulation (EC) n. 139/2004 of the Council of 20 January 2004, OJ L 24/1. 
172 P Areeda, Antitrust Law, vol. IIIA (Little, Brown,Boston, 1996), 208; M Siragusa & M Beretta, above n 76, para 6α. 
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relevant market, in which the holder thereof is dominant, without any detailed market analysis 
being necessary.173  
ii) Reversal of the burden of proof: contrary to ‘traditional’ Article 82 cases, where the 
aggrieved competitor must show abuse, it is for the holder of the facility to prove that his 
refusal to grant access to the facility is justified, on the basis of objective criteria.174  
iii) The practical effects of the doctrine are different: contrary to Article 81 EC cases, 
which tend to disallow agreements between undertakings, the application of the essential 
facilities doctrine leads to the making of such agreements. A refusal to deal/supply which is 
found to be contrary to Article 82 EC is altogether void and, thus, the dominant undertaking is 
simply compelled to give access to/supply its competitors and/or customers; under the 
essential facilities doctrine, on the other hand, the holder of the facility is allowed to impose 
reasonable access conditions and to receive a fee.175 An illustration of this point may be 
given by reference to the well-known ice-cabinet saga.176 HB, a dominant supplier of ‘impulse 
ice-cream’ was providing retailers with the necessary freezer cabinets, free of charge, against 
an ‘exclusivity clause’. This would prevent retailers from stocking other ice-cream in the 
freezers. Hence, if they were to sell competitive ice-creams, they either had to pay HB for an 
‘exclusivity free’ cabinet freezer or get a second one from HB’s competitors. The Commission 
found that this had a foreclosing effect for new entrants and, under Article 82 EC, required HB 
to declare void the exclusivity clause. Hence, retailers were henceforth free to stock at will 
competitive ice-creams in HB’s freezer cabinets, without competitors bearing any cost. If, on 
the other hand, the freezer cabinets were held to constitute essential facilities, then 
competitors should negotiate with HB limited access thereto, against a reasonable fee. 
Hence, HB would be better off through the application of the essential facility doctrine 
(because of the fee), rather than a pure application of Article 82 EC. 
iv) The above ice-cream example gives yet a further illustration of how the essential 
facilities doctrine could be used, depending on the facts of each specific case, to regulate the 
conduct of dominant undertakings. If, indeed, the retailers had not complained to the 
Commission, then the doctrine would provide a ground for complaint by the competitors 
themselves. 
                                                          
173See in the US, Fishman v. Estate of Wirtz, 807 F.2d 520 (7th Cir. 1986), where the stadium home to the Chicago 
Bulls was considered to be ‘essential’ without there being any effort to find whether any other stadium in Chicago 
could hold their games; in the EC, see all the port cases  (above 1.1.1. At the EU level), where the Commission held 
that each port was a market of its own. More importantly, see the judgment in Bronner above n 48, where the Court 
held that the market for home delivery was a separate market in which Mediaprint was dominant, notwithstanding the 
existence of substitutes (to which the Court referred itself in order to refute the ‘essential’ character of the facility in 
question). 
174 See above 1.2.1.4. The distinction between the market of the facility and an ancillary market for which the facility 
is indispensable. 
175 See above 1.2.2.1. Access to the facility under reasonable terms. 
176 See recently Case T-65/98 Van den Bergh (ex HB) v. Commission [2003] nyr. 
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2.1.1.2. A doctrine or just a legislative pattern? 
Compulsory third party access to the infrastructure has been the core legislative pattern within 
the EU for the deregulation of traditional ‘natural’ monopolies. In the field of 
telecommunications the Open Network Provision Directives,177 together with the Local Loop 
Unbundling Regulation178 allowed the progressive deregulation of telecommunications 
services, which eventually led to the complete liberalization in July 2003.179 In the field of 
energy, Directives 2003/54 for electricity180 and 2003/55 for natural gas181 set out the 
conditions and procedures for (negotiated and) regulated Third Party Access to the transport 
grid and the distribution network. Similarly, in the field of rail transport, framework Directive 
91/440/EC,182 together with the Directives on licensing,183 capacity allocation184 and 
interoperability,185 make sure that the basic rail infrastructure of incumbent operators is made 
available to competitors for the provision of transport services. 
These Directives tend to describe and/or define the parts of the infrastructure/facility to which 
access should be granted. Moreover, they set out the conditions under which access should 
be offered and those under which it may objectively be refused. In addition, they provide basic 
rules for the calculation of the access fee, together with minimal guarantees of non-
discrimination and transparency.186
a. Just a pattern? 
This has prompted some writers to submit that the essential facilities doctrine should be no 
more than the general background to the above body of legislation. It should be seen as a 
                                                          
177 Framework Directive 90/387/EEC of the Council of 28 June 1990, OJ L 192/1; Directive 92/44/EC of the Council of 
5 June 1992, concerning leased lines, OJ L 165/27; Directive 97/33/EC of the European Parliament and the Council 
of 30 June 1997 concerning interconnection, OJ L 199/32; Direcitve 98/10/EC of the Council of 28 February 1998, 
concerning voice telephony, OJ L 101/24. For an overview of the ONP technique see V Hatzopoulos, ‘L’Open 
Network Provision moyen de la dérégulation’ (1994) Revue Trimestrielle de Droit Européen 63. 
178 Regulation (EC) n. 2887/2000 of the European Parliament and the Council of 18 December 2000, OJ L 366/24. 
179 See the series of Directives of the European Parliament and the Council of 7 March 2002: Directive 2002/19/EC 
concerning access to the networks, OJ L 108/7, Directive 2002/20/EC concerning licensing, OJ L 108/21; Directive 
2002/21/EC, the framework directive, OJ L 108/33 and Directive 2002/22/EC concerning universal service, OJ L 
108/51. 
180Directive 2003/54 of the European Parliament and the Council of 26 June 2003, replacing Directive 96/92, OJ L 
176/37. 
181 Directive 2003/55 of the European Parliament and the Council of 26 June 2003, OJ [2003] L 176/57. 
182 Directive 91/440/EEC of the Council of 29 June 1991, OJ L 237/25, as modified by Directive 2001/12/EC of the 
European Parliament and the Council of 26 February 2001, OJ L 75/1. 
183 Directive 95/18 of the Council of 19 June 1995, OJ L 143/70, as modified by Directive 2001/13/EC of the 
European Parliament and the Council of 26 February 2001, OJ L 75/26. 
184 Directive 2001/14/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 26 February 2001, OJ L 75/29. 
185 Directive 96/48/EC of the Council of 23 July 1996, OJ L 235/6 and Directive 2001/16 of the European Parliament 
and the Council of 19 March 2001, for high speed and conventional trains, respectively. A ‘third railway package’ was 
adopted by the EP and the Council in March 2004, amending the above Directives and establishing a European 
Railway Agency; see Directives 2004/49, 2004/50 and 2004/51 [2004] OJ L 164/44 et seq; see also Regulation (EC) 
881/2004 [2004] L 164/1 for the Agency. 
186 For a more detailed discussion of these issues see D Geradin, ‘L’ouverture à la concurrence des enterprises de 
réseau – Analyse des principaux enjeux du processus de libéralisation’ (2001) Cahiers de Droit Européen 13, and P 
Jan Slot & A Skudder, ‘Common Features of Community Law in the Network-Bound Sectors’ (2001) CML Rev 87. 
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general legislative pattern underpinning the liberalisation directives.187 According to these 
writers, compulsory access to an essential facility is too complicated an issue to be handled 
by judges. Judges lack the legitimacy for striking the appropriate balance between the various 
policy objectives at stake. Moreover, they do not have the material resources, time and 
command of economics required to make a clear decision as to the desirability of access. In 
addition, it is very difficult for them to impose the appropriate conditions of access, let alone to 
monitor their observance by the parties. Calculating the appropriate access fee, which will 
enhance competition without excessively burdening the holder of the facility, is a task which 
may only be carried out, if at all, by specialists.188 Finally, judges decide on a case-by-case 
basis and upon variable criteria, potentially creating legal and economic uncertainty. 
This argument is complemented by a further – even more restrictive – one. Several authors 
argue that the essential facilities doctrine should only apply to natural monopolies. The term 
‘natural monopoly’ is used for sectors of the economy where the cost structure is such that no 
combination of undertakings may operate as cost efficiently as a single supplier.189 This 
happens when the marginal cost of production is steadily decreasing (typically after significant 
investment in infrastructure): each undertaking is inclined to produce as much as possible to 
keep reducing marginal and, ultimately, average total cost. This, however, may be impossible 
because of a) scarcity of (one of) the resources or other physical constraint (such as limited 
transport capacity) and b) demand which is not infinite. Therefore, if more undertakings have 
to share the market in question, each one of them will be producing less than its full capacity, 
at a higher total cost than under monopoly conditions. Hence, a monopoly is socially 
preferable. Most natural monopolies, such as telecommunications, postal services, rail 
transport etc, were made into legal monopolies during the 50s and 60s.  
However, monopolies cease to be natural when technology reverses one (at least) of the 
conditions on which such monopoly is based: a) when substitute resources or capacity is 
made available or b) demand is increased. A further factor which weakens natural monopolies 
is specialization: competitors may be able to offer cheaper goods/services in squarely defined 
niche markets, thus undercutting the monopolist’s volume of sales and increasing his 
marginal cost. It is no coincidence that the deregulation wave of the ‘90s started from the field 
of telecommunications and with specific value-added services. Nowadays, therefore, where 
technological progress runs in overdrive and specialization is greater than ever, the very 
existence of natural monopolies is questioned. Hence, the argument according to which the 
essential facilities doctrine should only apply to the deregulation of natural monopolies, to a 
great extent rejoins the one previously presented, i.e. that it should only be confined to 
                                                          
187Doherty above n 149; see also S Gorinson, ‘Overview: Essential Facilities and Regulation: Court or Agency 
Jurisdiction’ (1990) Antitrust LJ 879. 
188 See above 1.2.2.1. Access to the facility under reasonable termsc. 
189 WJ Baumol, EE Bailey, & RD Willig ‘Weak invisible hand theorems on the sustainability of multiproduct natural 
monopoly’ (1977) American Economic Review 350; see also M Waterson, Regulation of the Firm and Natural 
Monopoly (Cambridge (Mass.), Blackwell, 1988). 
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legislative application in order to liberalize the (already liberalized, to a great extent) traditional 
natural monopolies. This argument, about natural monopolies, serves more as an ex post 
conceptualisation of the deregulation already achieved, rather than as an analytical 
instrument for the future, since it seems to preclude any further substantial use of the 
essential facility toolkit.  
b. Or rather a doctrine? 
 The opinions expressed above do not correspond to the practice of the EC 
Institutions.  
First, the EC legislature has followed the essential facilities doctrine or pattern to regulate not 
only ‘traditional’ natural monopolies, such as trains, but also different sectors of the economy. 
Hence, basic elements of the essential facilities doctrine are to be found in the cross-border 
transfers Directive.190 Similarly, in the field of air transport, the Council Regulation concerning 
slot allocation,191 the block exemption Regulation for computerized reservation systems192 
and the Directive for groundhandling services,193 all embody the concept of essential facility. 
The same is true for the latest set of legislation in the field of telecommunications, which 
completely liberalizes the sector.194 Therefore, the idea that the legislator should only have 
recourse to the essential facility pattern in order to open up traditional monopolies does not 
hold true any more than the idea that the doctrine should only apply to monopolies. 
 Second, it is clear that the application of the essential facilities doctrine is far from 
being a one way street: the legislator constantly finds inspiration in the practice of the other 
Institutions. Hence, the Commission Notice on the application of competition rules on access 
agreements in the telecommunications sector,195 which defines essential facilities as being ‘a 
facility or infrastructure which is essential for reaching customers and/or enabling competitors 
to carry on their business, and which cannot be replicated by any reasonable means’ draws 
on previous case law of the Commission and the Court. This same Communication has, 
subsequently, been used as a reference point for the enactment of the recent package of 
Directives in the field. Therefore, the doctrine, far from being the preserve of the legislator 
alone, is the result of ‘cyclical’ interaction between all the Institutions of the EU, 
administrative, judicial and legislative.  
                                                          
190 Directive 97/5/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 27 January 1997, OJ L 43/25; see also the 
relevant Communication, COM 95/C 251/03. 
191 Regulation (EC) n. 95/93 of the Council of 18 January 1993, OJ L 14/1. 
192 Regulation (EC) n. 3652/93 of the Commission of 22 December 1993, OJ L 333/37. 
193 Directive 96/67/EC of the Council of 15 October 1996, OJ L 272/36. 
194 See above n 136. 
195 98/C 265/02, OJ C 265, 26-8-1998, see also N Nikolinakos, ‘Access Agreements in the Telecommunications 
Sector – Refusal to Supply and the Essential Facilities Doctrine under EC Competition Law’ (1999) ECLR 399. 
 36
 More importantly, the ECJ itself reasons in terms of the essential facilities doctrine. It 
is true that the Court has never expressly named the doctrine, but the CFI has done so on 
several occasions.196 Moreover, Advocates General Jacobs in Bronner and Tizzano in IMS 
have made extensive developments concerning the conditions and effects of the doctrine. 
 Finally, there is no doubt that the Commission in its competition practice does 
regularly – albeit in an increasingly restrictive manner – refer to the essential facilities 
doctrine.197
 From the above it follows that, in EU competition law, the existence of some essential 
facility does not only give rise to a specific legislative pattern. Rather, it leads all the 
Institutions to follow, in their respective field of competence, some basic common principles. 
Therefore, it seems justified to talk of a general doctrine of essential facilities. This position is 
also embraced by the majority of writers,198 and can hardly be disputed after the judgments of 
the Court in Bronner and IMS  Health. 
2.1.2. Negative definition of a doctrine (limits) 
The policy considerations underlying the doctrine of essential facilities would be impaired if 
the obligations thus imposed deterred undertakings from developing important facilities. 
Indeed, the few undertakings which may afford the R&D and other costs for constructing a 
significant infrastructure or facility would have second thoughts if they knew that they would 
not be allowed to collect monopoly profits.199 Therefore, several considerations should be 
taken into account in order to limit or, indeed, exclude the application of the essential facilities 
doctrine.  
2.1.2.1. Will the access imposed enhance competition in the ancillary market?200
 The doctrine of essential facilities relies on a fundamental distinction between, on the 
one hand, the facility itself and, on the other hand, an ancillary market for which access to the 
facility is indispensable.201 Magill and, more importantly, IMS Health, teach us that the 
ancillary market may not actually exist, provided that demand for the good/service in question 
                                                          
196 Cases SNCF & BRB v. Commission, European Night Services, Gencor v. Commission and  Aéroports de Paris v. 
Commission and Coe Clerici, all quoted above in 1.1.1.2. The CFI/ECJ. 
197 See above 1.1.1.1 Commission practice. 
198 See, in this direction: J Temple Lang above n. 155, J Venit & J Kallaugher, E Gippini-Fournier, F Fine, R Pitofsky, 
and M Harz, all quoted above and E Sheehan, ‘Unilateral Refusals to Deal and the Role of the Essential Facility 
Doctrine, A US/EC Comparative Analysis’ (1999) World Comp. Rev. 67. 
199 See among others, P Areeda, ‘Essential Facilities: An Epithet in need of Limiting Principles’ (1990) Antitrust L.J. 
841 and  A Overd & B Bishop, ‘Essential facilities : The rising Tide’ above n 47 at 183. Also, J Ratner, ‘Should there 
Be an Essential Facility Doctrine?’ (1988) University of California, Davis, Law Review, 327, M-E Schill, ‘Refusals to 
Deal by Single Firm Monopolists – Should we Rob Peter to Save Paul?’ (1998) Notre Dame Law Review 214. 
200 This consideration limiting the scope of the doctrine directly stems from the basic assumption underlying the 
doctrine, that competition be enhanced through the facility being forcibly made available to competition. 
201 As for the question whether these should be two distinguishable markets, in competition law terms, see above 
1.2.1.3. Elimination of competition 
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is real. If however, the ancillary market does exist and the facility holder is already present in 
it, will the forcible introduction of a new competitor necessarily enhance competition? Several 
factors are to be taken into consideration: 
i) Is the new entrant ‘strong’ enough in order to create and maintain a reasonable 
market share? If not, proportionality argues in favour of the facility holder.202 
ii) Is the new entrant the sole competitor of the facility holder in the ancillary market? If 
not, a) do the existing competitors offer a sufficient degree of competition and b) do they have 
access to the facility?203 
iii) Is there no substitute at all to the facility? It is to be noted in this respect that, 
according to Bronner, this issue is to be appreciated in a much wider context than the 
traditional delimitation of relevant markets and that even imperfect substitutes are to be taken 
into account.204 
2.1.2.2. Has the facility been built on private resources and entrepreneurship? 
The doctrine of essential facilities has served as an instrument for the deregulation of 
traditional natural monopolies, such as ports, airports etc.205 Where the R&D for and 
construction of the facility have been financed by public funds, policy considerations argue in 
favour of enlarged access rights. The same applies for facilities built/developed by private 
undertakings, where such undertakings enjoyed special or exclusive rights and had the 
opportunity to recoup the cost thereof, sheltered from competition. The same may also be 
true for entirely private facilities, which are relatively old and completely amortized by the time 
access to them is requested. 
The situation is different, however, where the facility has been developed by purely private 
means, within a genuinely competitive environment. Hence, in European Night Services206 
the importance of the investment projected by the joint venture combined with the high risk 
involved, was taken into account by the CFI in order to annul the Commission decision which 
required the joint venture to grant access to third parties after an initial period of eight years. 
In the same vein, the Local Loop Unbundling (LLU)  Regulation,207 limits the access rights of 
third parties to the old twisted metallic pair circuits, to the exclusion of more modern networks. 
The reason for this is that incumbent ‘operators rolled out their metallic local access 
                                                          
202 See above 1.2.1.5. The requirement that the facility be used for a ‘new’ product 
203 Only an optimal number of - not all - competitors should have access to the facility. See above 1.2.2.2. 
Complementary obligations of the facility holder 
204 See above, 1.2.1.2. Essential. See also J Sharpe, ‘The doctrine of Essential Facilities: Defining the Relevant 
Market’ (1996) Essex Law Review 44. 
205 For the concept of ‘natural monopolies’, see 2.1.1.2. A doctrine or just a legislative pattern?. 
206 European Night Services  above n 27. 
207 Regulation (EC) 2887/2000 of the European Parliament and the Council of 18 December 2000, concerning the 
Unbundling of the Local Loop, OJ L 366/24. 
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infrastructures over significant periods of time protected by exclusive rights and were able to 
fund investment costs through monopoly rents’.208 This does not mean, however, that any 
privately financed, newly-built facility will necessarily evade the application of the essential 
facilities doctrine: nowhere in its judgment in Bronner did the Court attach any importance to 
the purely private origin of the distribution network to which access was asserted. 
Further, the fact that a facility is controlled by numerous undertakings, by virtue of an 
agreement or concerted practice, may argue in favour of the application of the doctrine. 
Hence, in situations where several undertakings pool their assets, thus creating an essential 
facility,209 the merits of the individual arguments available to each of the undertakings may 
not counter the application of the doctrine. If the same facility were built by a single 
undertaking, the situation could be different. It follows, therefore, that for the same material 
facility, Article 81 situations may lead to different results, as far as the applicability of the 
essential facilities doctrine is concerned, from cases analysed under Article 82 EC.210
2.1.2.3. Is the facility essential due to the efforts of its owner? 
A further issue, linked to the previous one, is whether the ‘essential’ character of the facility is 
due to its intrinsic characteristics, or to other external factors and/or ‘externalities’.211 In the 
former case credit should be given to the maker/holder of the facility, who should, therefore, 
be treated more leniently than in the latter case. The Commission and Court seem inclined to 
follow such an approach, albeit in a discreet manner. 
Contrary to the Channel Tunnel (in European Night Services), the daily TV listings (in Magill) 
had nothing intrinsically essential. They constituted raw material, protected by IPRs, for a 
product for which there was demand in the market. However, the holders of the relevant IPRs 
had put no creative or other effort in compiling the listings (which were a by-product of their 
core activity). The Commission, confirmed by the CFI and ECJ, did not dispute the existence 
of the IPRs, but ‘bypassed’ them, invoking ‘exceptional circumstances’. One of the reasons, 
explicitly put forward by the Commission was that the bottleneck facility (i.e. the daily TV 
listings) incorporated no creative or financial effort whatsoever on the part of the holder. 
                                                          
208 Paragraph 3 of the Regulation. 
209 Situation prevailing in United States v. Terminal Railroad Association above n 2, and the Commission decisions in 
Eurotunnel above n ,26 and European Night Services above n 24. 
210 For the relationship of the essential facilities doctrine with the rules on concerted practices, on the one hand and 
on dominant position, on the other, see below 2.2.1.1 Relation of the doctrine with other competition rules. 
211 For the concept of externalities, see below 2.1.2.4. The existence of IPRs – externalities in general are not 
described in that section, only network externalities. 
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In the same vein, in the IMS Health case, which concerned a protected database structure, 
the Commission stressed that the protected structure a) had been developed with the active 
participation of all the industries participating in the market – not by the holder of the rights 
alone – and b) that it became essential because the market embraced it – not because of any 
particular intrinsic quality.212 The Court’s judgment broadly embraced the Commission’s 
approach as it held that 213
the degree of participation by users in the development of that [essential] structure and the 
outlay, particularly in terms of cost, on the part of potential users […] on the basis of an 
alternative structure are factors which must be taken into consideration in order to determine 
whether the protected structure is indispensable. 
In the Microsoft case currently pending before the Court, one of the main arguments invoked 
by the defendants (Microsoft) in order to deny the disclosure obligation imposed by the 
Commission, is precisely the extremely high creative effort and economic value embodied by 
the information concerned. 
In this respect the judgment of the Court in KPN Telekom may be of some interest. In this 
case the new entrants in the market for directory listings were requiring the incumbent 
monopolist to give them access to information. They requested not only the basic client 
information (name, phone number and address) directly linked to the activity of providing 
telecommunication services, but also access to value added information gathered by the 
monopolist committing extra resources, such as the profession, fax number, mobile phone 
number, etc of listed people. The Court did not rule out that such information could be the 
object of a compulsory foreclosure, but made clear that the effort necessary for its collection 
and organization should be compensated for by the access fee. 
2.1.2.4. The existence of IPRs 
 The above issue, concerning the creative effort of the facility holder, gives rise to 
lively theoretical controversy where, as in Magill, IMS and more importantly Microsoft, the 
facility is protected by IPRs. Contrary to material property rights, which are obtained randomly 
                                                          
212 For the issue of market externalities, see below 2.1.2.4. The existence of IPRs 
213 IMS Health v NDC Health above n 37, para 29 and operative part.  
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through the unilateral initiative of their owner, IPRs are awarded and protected by the public 
authorities. They embody policy choices concerned with fostering innovation and long term 
economic development. The question arises whether the policy considerations lying behind 
competition law – and more particularly, the doctrine of essential facilities – may legitimately 
counter those underlying the system of IPR protection. The present author agrees with the 
approach followed by the Commission and EC Courts,214 according to which the existence of 
IPRs should not exclude altogether the application of the doctrine of essential facilities.215 
This finding is based on a series of (at least) five arguments.216  
First, IPR and the essential facilities doctrine are entirely different policy instruments and, 
therefore, the existence of the former does not prevent the application of the latter. 
Differences are to be found in, at least three respects: 
- the theoretical background of IPR, on the one hand and the doctrine of essential facilities, 
on the other, are completely different: protection of IPRs is linked to the personality of the 
creator and tends to reward invention, while the essential facilities doctrine aims to protect or 
enhance the competitive structure of the market; 
- the economic aim of IPRs is to ensure monopoly profits for the owner thereof, in order to 
foster research and encourage creativity. By contrast, the essential facility doctrine is 
designed to prevent the holder of the facility from receiving such exorbitant profits; 
- the regulatory pattern followed by IPRs is objectively oriented (reward invention in order 
to foster research, etc), while the essential facilities doctrine is procedure oriented (maintain 
the competitive structure of the market, keep the market going). 
- both IPRs and the essential facilities doctrine tend to establish an optimal balance 
between the exclusivity, the reward of innovation and long term competition, on the one hand 
and short term competition and consumer welfare on the other hand. However, IPRs apply in 
a general manner and ex ante, while the essential facilities doctrine applies on a case by case 
basis and ex post.217 
                                                          
214 In Magill above n 28, IMS above n 37, and Microsoft above n 91. 
215 The theoretical debate is vivid: Completely opposed to any meddling with IPRs are, among others, A Lipsky & G 
Sidak, ‘Essential Facilities’ (1999) Stanford Law Review 1187, also available at 
http://www.criterioneconomics.com/documents/essentialfac.pdf; V Korah, ‘Access to Essential Facilities under the 
Commerce Act in the Light of Experience in Australia, the European Union and the United States’ (2000) Virginia 
University World Law Review 231 and ‘The Ladbroke Saga’ above n  47. On the opposite edge, see R Pitofsky, ‘The 
essential Facilities Doctrine Under US Antitrust Law’ above n 118, and F Fine, ‘NDC/IMS: A Logical Application of the 
Essential Facilities Doctrine’ above n 36, as well as the American Committee for Interoperable Systems, ACIS 
Comments on Draft Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing and Acquisition of Intellectual Property, available at 
http://www.interop.org./Antitrust.html. In between the two extremes, see T Cotter, ‘Intellectual Property and the 
essential facilities doctrine’ (1999) The Antitrust Bulletin 211 (moderately negative) and F Denozza, ‘Refusal to Deal 
and IPRs’ above n 118 (moderately positive). 
216 Which will only be briefly spelled out here; for more substantial developments see i.a. T Cotter above n 215 at 217 
where further references to the US doctrine; R Merkin, ‘The Interface Between Anti-trust and Intellectual Property’ 
(1985) ECLR 377; J Hughes, ‘The Philosophy of Intellectual Property’ Georgetown Law Journal 287; T Palmer, ‘Are 
Patents and Copyrights Morally Justified? The Philosophy of Property Rights and Ideal Objects’ (1990) Harvard Law 
Journal & Public Policy 817. More recently see ‘U. Bath Access to Information v. Intellectual Property Rights’ (2002) 
European Intellectual Property Review 138. 
217 Writers are divided on whether an ex ante or ex post balancing is preferable. See C Ritter, ‘Refusal to Deal and 
“Essential Facilities”: Does Intellectual Property Require Special Deference Compared to Tangible Property?’ (2005) 
World Competition 281, at 287, who argues that an ex post appreciation may be more accurate because a) market 
information about the actual value of the market is more complete after the IPR have been granted and b) antitrust 
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Second, IPRs are subject to various limitations already (both ratione materiae and ratione 
temporis) and exceptions (compulsory licences, exhaustion of rights etc…). Therefore, they 
do not provide absolute protection. 
Third, the absolute protection of IPRs tends to ignore a) that the holder of the IPR does not 
necessarily use his right in order to satisfy demand (as was the case in Magill) and b) that the 
object of IPRs is often distorted by network externalities,218 which allow him unjustified excess 
monopoly profits.  
Fourth, IPRs do not provide a precise relationship or “calibration” between the initial 
investment of and the payoffs to the holder. Depending on the market conditions, the IP 
holder may be under-protected and under-rewarded (e.g. if the protected good or service was 
not commercially successful or was subject to fierce competition by substitutes) or, 
conversely, over-protected and over-rewarded (e.g. where network externalities strengthen 
his position). The corrective application of competition law in cases of over-protection seems 
desirable for the general good (though not necessarily that of the IPR holder).219
These four arguments speak in favour of the corrective – although extremely limited and 
restrictive – application of the doctrine of essential facilities to IPRs. The Community legislator 
follows this pattern: in many legislative acts which establish or protect IPRs, the legislator 
inserts reservations in favour of competition and, at times, provides for the imposition of 
forced access, to this effect (fifth argument).220
2.2. An EU doctrine?  
 According to the developments above, an essential facilities doctrine does exist under 
EC law. The question which emerges, then, is whether this doctrine is a pure transposition of 
the US ‘parent’ doctrine, or whether within the EU the rule has been developed differently.221 
                                                                                                                                                                      
enforcers and judges are less likely to be influenced by lobbying than the legislature. Also B Rotenberg, ‘The Legal 
Regulation of Software Interoperability in the EU’ above n 40 who argues that an ex post appreciation of IPRs is 
necessary not only for economic, but also for human rights reasons, in particular to ensure that the freedom of 
expression (Art 10 ECHR) is respected. Contra see, among many, R O’Donoghue & JA Padilla, above n 126, at 6 et 
seq. and also 37, who argue that innovation is crucial for economic development and that every successful good or 
product reaching the market corresponds to many more failed efforts, which should be compensated for and 
therefore, any ex post tampering with IPRs is undesirable. See also I Forrester, ‘The Interaction …’, above n 8 , who 
urges that any ex post intervention need to be predictable in order for it to be lawful; on a slightly different tone see J 
Temple Lang, ‘European Competition Policy and Regulation …’ above n 93, who generally argues in favour of a clear 
separation between the ex ante regulatory and the ex post supervisory functions of State authorities. 
218 M Lemley & D McGowan, ‘Legal Implications of Network Economic Effects’ (1998) California.Law Review 479, at 
483; Lopatka, J. & Page, W., Microsoft, Monopolization and Network Externalities…’ above n 43. See also the 
monograph by N Economides, ‘The Economics of Networks’ (1996) International Journal of Industrial Organization, 
available at http://www.stern.nyu.edu/networks/top.html; N Economides & L White, ‘One-way Networks, Two-way 
networks, Compatibility and Anti-trust’ (1993) available at http://www.stern.nyu.edu/networks/93-14; of the same, 
‘Networks and Compatibility: Implications for Anti-trust’ (1994) European Economic Review  651. 
219 The totality of this argument is taken by C Ritter, above n 217, at 292-294. 
220 See e.g. Directive 96/9/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 11 March 1996, for the legal protection 
of databases, OJ L 77/20, articles 13 and 16(3); Regulation (EC) n. 2100/94 of the Council of 27 July 1994, on plant 
variety rights, OJ L 227/1, art. 29; Directive 98/44/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 6 July 1998, on 
the legal protection of biotechnological inventions, OJ L 213/13, art. 12; Directive 98/71/EC of the European 
Parliament and the Council, of 13 October 1998, on the legal protection of designs, OJ L 289/28, art 7(2).  
221 This is an issue which has been extensively debated by writers, see i.a. the excellent article by Venit, J. & 
Kallaugher, J., ‘Essential Facilities: A Comparative Law Approach’ above n 117, who put forward the view that within 
the EU the role of the doctrine should be more limited than in the US. For a different view see, J Temple Lang, 
‘Defining Legitimate Competition…’ above n 155, who gives a series of arguments in favour of the doctrine occupying 
a more important role in the EU legal order (p. 280 et seq.) but explains that, in fact, the judicial applications of the 
doctrine are more limited in the EU than in the US (p. 309 et seq.). See also, for a neutral but well documented 
comparison between the US and the EU doctrine, E Sheehan above n 198, and A Capobianco, ‘The Essential 
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It will be argued that the differences, which already exist, between the two doctrines (2.2.1) 
may develop further under the weight of the EU internal market requirements (2.2.2). 
2.2.1. Differences between the US and the EU doctrine of essential facilities 
2.2.1.1 Relation of the doctrine with other competition rules 
a) In the field of concerted practices, Section 1 of the Sherman Act, contrary to Article 81 EC, 
does not contain any express derogations. Section 1 has been made flexible through the 
application of the rule of reason. As mentioned above, the foundation case of the essential 
facilities doctrine, the US v. Terminal Road Association case,222 was no more than an early 
application of the rule of reason. The Supreme Court, in that case, found that the proposed 
association did promote efficiency, but could hinder competition. Therefore, instead of 
ordering divestiture, the Supreme Court identified the essential facility at stake and imposed 
an access requirement. 
The judicial origin and the imprecise content of the rule of reason223 allow for greater flexibility 
in the application of the relevant US provision than the express exceptions of Article 81(3) EC. 
Therefore, a rule which legitimises agreements between undertakings, such as the essential 
facilities doctrine, finds its place more easily within the US than in the EU system of 
competition rules. 
b) In the field of abuse of dominance too, there are strong arguments in favor of a more 
extensive application of the essential facilities doctrine in the US than in the EU. In the US 
system of competition the prevailing rule, known as the ‘Colgate Doctrine’224 is that of 
freedom (not) to deal, provided there is no monopoly purpose. This rule covers all 
undertakings, even dominant ones, as long as their conduct is not dictated merely by the 
intent of creating or strengthening a position of dominance. Article 82, on the other hand, 
based on a ‘special responsibility’,225 imposes strict limitations on the behavior of dominant 
undertakings. The imposition of further obligations, under the EU doctrine of essential 
facilities, on dominant undertakings, should be made with caution so as not to overburden 
those undertakings.226
                                                                                                                                                                      
Facility Doctrine: Similarities and differences between the American and the European Approach’ (2001) European 
Law Review 548. See more generally on the issue of freedom to deal in the two jurisdictions, J Adams, ‘Antitrust 
Constraints on Single Firm Refusals to Deal in the EEC and the US’ (1985) Texas International Law Journal 12. 
222 United States v. Terminal Railroad Association, above n 2. 
223 The issue of the precise content and scope of the rule of reason may not be tackled here, see however, R Whish 
above n 29 at 124-126; D Fasquelle, Droit américain et droit communautaire des ententes, Etude de la règle de 
raison (Paris, éd. Joly, 1993), R Kovar, ‘Le droit communautaire de la concurrence et la règle de raison’ (1987) 
Revue Trimestrielle de Droit Européen 237, G Wills, ‘Rule of reason: une règle raisonable en droit communautaire?’ 
(1990) Cahiers de Droit Européen 19. 
224 Because it was strongly asserted for the first time by the Supreme Court in United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 
U.S. 300 (1919). 
225 See R Whish aove n 29 at 188-189. 
226 The counterargument, in favour of a more extensive application of the essential facilities doctrine in the EU, is one 
of strength: Article 2 of the Sherman Act intervenes at an earlier stage than Article 82 EC, since it tends to avert the 
creation or strengthening of a dominant position, not merely its abuse. Therefore, at this later stage, where dominant 
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2.2.1.2. Conditions for the application of the doctrine 
 The EU doctrine has, in some respects, a wider scope of application than its US 
equivalent, while in others it applies in a stricter way. 
a) ‘In the US the essential facilities doctrine focuses on effects in markets where a firm holds 
market power subject to control under Section 2 (of Sherman Act). The Article 82 EC cases, 
in contrast appear to apply the concept in a monopoly leveraging context without extensive 
consideration of the extent to which the dominant firm holds a dominant position in a 
downstream market.’227 Therefore, in ICG/Morlaix (Port of Roscoff)228 the Commission 
expressly applied the essential facilities doctrine and obliged the local Chambers of 
Commerce to allow a competitor to have access to the port facilities, in order for it to offer a 
completely new route, where the Chambers had no presence whatsoever. Similarly, in 
Aéroports de Paris229 the CFI and ECJ contemplated the application of the essential facilities 
doctrine despite the fact that the holder of the facility (ADP) was entirely absent from the 
ancillary market (for catering). An even clearer statement of the idea that the holder of the 
facility need not be present in the ancillary market is to be found in the EU 
telecommunications legislation. There, the idea is clearly put forward that  
where an undertaking has significant market power in a specific market, it may also be 
deemed to have significant market power in a closely related market, where the links between 
the two markets are such as to allow market power held in one market to be leveraged into 
the other market.230  
b) On the other hand, after the judgment in Bronner,231 it would seem that in the EU a facility 
will not be held to be essential unless it is absolutely indispensable for the competitors. In this 
respect the US authorities are more lenient, since they are ready to apply the doctrine of 
essential facilities where the refusal to give access to a facility merely creates a ‘severe 
handicap’ for potential competitors.232
 
2.2.1.3. Effects of the doctrine 
 When the US authorities apply the essential facilities doctrine, the outcome for the 
facility holder is the obligation to grant access to the competitor(s), for a reasonable fee. In the 
EU, on the contrary, more complex obligations may be imposed upon the facility holder, who 
is supposed to manage the facility as if he were an official authority or an independent third 
                                                                                                                                                                      
undertakings are about to abuse market power, stricter control is justified; see M Harz, ‘Dominance and Duty in the 
EU : A Look Through Microsoft Windows at the Essential Facilities Doctrine,’ available at 
http://www.law.emory.edu/EILR/volumes/spg97/HARZ.html. 
227 Venit & Kallaugher, above n 117 at 333. 
228 ICG/CCI Morlaix (Port of Roscoff) above n 17. 
229 Case T-128/98 Aéroports de Paris v. Commission [2000] above n 23, and further by the ECJ, see Case C-82/01 P 
Aéroports de Paris v. Commission [2002] above n 23. 
230 Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 7 March 2002, framework directive for 
electronic communications (telecommunications), OJ L 108/33, article 14(3). 
231 Oscar Bronner above n 48. 
232 See case Hecht v. Pro-Football Inc, 570 F.2d 982 (D.C. Cir. 1977); this point is also made by Doherty, above n 
149 at 425. 
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party. This may be seen as being reminiscent of the idea, omnipresent in the sector-specific 
liberalisation directives – that universal service should be maintained. Hence, in Sea 
Containers v. Stena Sealink233 the Commission invoked the essential facilities doctrine, not to 
allow the complainant access to the port facilities (which he already had), but in order to make 
sure that he was treated in a non-discriminatory way in relation to timetables and other 
conditions of use of the facility.234 These complementary conditions, described above,235 may 
be particularly burdensome for the holder of the facility, as they may affect not only his 
conduct but also his corporate structure.236 In the same vein, in Microsoft, the Commission 
required the dominant firm to make available interface information to competitors on non-
discriminatory terms, although, from an economic point of view, it would have made more 
sense to allow price differentiation related to the extent that each competitor values the assets 
in question.237
2.2.2. The essential facilities doctrine, rule for the internal market? 
 Besides the technical considerations above, there are also some more general 
characteristics that distinguish the EC essential facilities doctrine from its US counterpart. EC 
competition law is not only concerned with economic efficiency, but seeks also to promote the 
functioning of the EC internal market.238 The Treaty rules on free movement and competition 
converge and often coincide.239 The EC essential facilities doctrine may be seen as one of 
the fields in which convergence is more pronounced. Two examples, one from the legislative 
practice of the institutions, the other one from the Court’s case law, will illustrate this point. 
2.2.2.1. Within legislation 
 It has been mentioned above240 that the privatisation and regulation of natural 
monopolies within the EU has followed a legislative pattern inspired by the essential facilities 
doctrine. Third party access to infrastructure, together with complementary rules assuring 
transparency, non-discrimination, rational allocation of resources, interoperability etc, 
compose the EU legislator’s approach in attempting to inject competition in fields where the 
existence of significant infrastructures has justified legal monopolies.  
                                                          
233 Sea Containers/Stena Sealink, above n 13 at 8. 
234 For the duty not to discriminate between different users see also the Aéroports de Paris judgments, above n 23.  
235 See above 1.2.2.2. Complementary obligations of the facility holder 
236 Price transparency and non-discrimination may require the facility holder to proceed to accounting unbundling 
and, in some circumstances, to full separation of the essential facility from its other activities. 
237 See Lévêque above at 150. 
238 See R Whish above n 29 at 20-21. 
239 For an excellent discussion of the convergence of the internal market and the competition rules in the EU, see J 
Baquero Cruz, Between Competition and Free Movement above n 15. See also K Mortelmans, ‘Towards 
convergence in the application of the rules on free movement and on competition’ (2001) CML Rev 613; J Stuyck, 
‘Libre circulation et concurrence: les deux piliers du marché commun’ in Mélanges en hommage à Michel 
Waelbroeck, vol II (Bruylant, 1999), 1477. 
240 See above 2.1.1.2. A doctrine or just a legislative pattern?. 
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Unsurprisingly, there has been a constant dialogue between the EU legislator instituting the 
deregulation directives and the Commission and Court formulating and applying the essential 
facilities doctrine. This explains why the basic principles and the general conditions of the two 
coincide.241 What should not be overlooked, however, is the fact that the vast majority of the 
deregulation directives aim primarily at the institution of an internal market in the relevant 
field, not the creation of competition. Reference to the legal basis of the deregulation 
directives dispels any doubt: Article 95 EC is the sole Treaty provision invoked in almost all 
directives, while very few are adopted by the Commission under Article 86(3). A further 
consequence of the fact that the essential facilities doctrine is being enshrined in legislation is 
that its addressees are not undertakings, but member states themselves. 
2.2.2.2. In the Court’s case law  
 The judgment of the Court in the Commission v. Greece (petroleum supplies) case242 
is highly relevant in this respect. The Greek petroleum market is divided into three separate 
markets: refining, wholesale marketing and retail distribution. Service stations may only get 
supplies from marketing companies, not the refineries themselves. Marketing companies are 
obliged to keep at all times minimum stocks of petrol within the national territory. Since 
stocking facilities are almost impossible to build (for environmental, urban planning, etc 
reasons) marketing companies have the right to require the refineries to keep these stocks on 
their behalf. The problem with the Greek legislation was that each marketing company could 
make use of such stocking capacity per refinery, as determined by reference to the quantities 
it had bought during the previous year from that same refinery. The effect of this legislation 
was that it excluded from the use of the ‘essential’ stocking facilities any new entrant (who did 
not have any quota based on his previous purchase volume) in the wholesale market. 
 All the elements for the application of the essential facilities doctrine were present in 
this case.243 Advocate General Colomer found in favor of the Commission’s position, which 
would transform the relevant market ‘in such a way that the storage of petroleum products will 
be governed by the laws of the market and of free competition’.244 The Commission for its 
part, in a decision approved by the Court, held that an access right to stocking facilities for a 
reasonable fee, should be recognized to any potential competitor. Hence, the logic which 
prevailed and the solution reached in this case seem to constitute a typical application of the 
essential facilities doctrine. This case, however, was not argued at all under the competition 
rules, but as a violation of Article 28 EC on the free movement of goods. 
                                                          
241 See above 2.1.1.2. A doctrine or just a legislative pattern? 
242 Case C-398/98 Commission v. Greece, petroleum supplies [2001] ECR I-7915. 
243 With the reservation that in the ancillary market there existed already quite some trading companies. 
244 Commission v Greece above n 242, para 43 of the opinion, in fine. 
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Conclusion 
 The developments described above lead to the conclusion that a) there is and b) 
there should be, such a thing as an EU essential facilities doctrine, albeit having a restricted 
scope of application. Moreover, an effort has been made, through a complete though brief 
reference to the Commission’s practice and CFI’s and ECJ’s case law, to identify the main 
constitutive elements of such a doctrine.  
Such an attempt, by definition, proceeds by generalizations and sometimes lacks precision. It 
allows, however, for a more synthetic view, passing by the specifics of each case. This is 
done on purpose: it is enough to know that one can, under certain circumstances, bring a 
claim under the essential facilities doctrine. Different Advocates General of the Court, just like 
officials of the EC Commission and, of course, academic writers, have divergent views on the 
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